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Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:  
The Surprising Lessons of Smith 
Kathleen A. Brady ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the protections afforded by the 
Free Exercise Clause when government regulation impacts the 
religious practices of individuals, and if one looks for guidance from 
the Supreme Court, the rules are fairly clear. Government action 
designed to thwart religious exercise is, of course, unconstitutional.1 
A more difficult issue arises when the state does not intend to 
burden religious exercise but does so inadvertently. Prior to 1990, 
the Supreme Court had long employed a balancing approach that 
afforded significant relief. Under this approach, developed in the 
seminal case Sherbert v. Verner,2 individuals were entitled to 
exemptions from laws that substantially burdened religious conduct 
unless enforcement was justified by a compelling state interest.3 In 
1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,4 the Supreme Court 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D., 1994, Yale Law 
School; M.A.R., 1991, Yale Divinity School; B.A., 1989, Yale College. My thanks to Fred 
Gedicks for the opportunity to participate in BYU Law School’s conference on church 
autonomy, to others who organized and participated in the conference, and to my 
commentators, Larry Sager and Laura Underkuffler, for their excellent feedback.  
 1. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 532–
33 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 3. The Court applied this approach in numerous cases. See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 
136, 141–42 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 
450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) 
(“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). During this period, the Supreme Court 
applied an approach more deferential to the government in the context of the military, see 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and prisons, see O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 
342 (1987). In addition, free exercise protections were not available where the relief sought by 
the claimant would have required the government to change the way it managed its own 
internal affairs. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 448–
49 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986). 
 4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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abandoned this balancing test for all but a few categories of cases.5 
Under the Court’s new rule, the Free Exercise Clause does not 
excuse individuals from compliance with neutral, generally applicable 
laws that are not intended to burden religious exercise.6 Scholarly 
writing addressing the proper scope of free exercise protections for 
individuals has been extensive, and even more than a decade after 
Smith, individual free exercise rights remain a familiar subject in the 
academic literature.7
The scholarly and judicial landscape is much different when one 
turns to the free exercise rights of religious organizations. Just as in 
the case of individuals, government regulation frequently impacts the 
activities of religious groups. For example, common areas of 
litigation include: the application of federal antidiscrimination 
statutes to employment decisions;8 the imposition of mandatory 
collective bargaining requirements under state and federal labor 
laws;9 the application of state licensing, teacher certification and 
 5. The balancing test still applies to “hybrid situations” involving free exercise claims in 
conjunction with other constitutional rights. See id. at 881–82. 
 6. Id. at 878–79.  
 7. For a sampling of influential articles, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine]; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable 
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998) [hereinafter 
Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation]; Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good 
of the Whole: A View From the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002); Douglas Laycock, Religious 
Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious 
Liberty as Liberty]; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 
[hereinafter Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise]; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and 
Free Exercise Revisionism, U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, In Defense of 
Smith]; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise 
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989–90) [hereinafter Marshall, The Case Against]; 
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of 
Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Singling Out 
Religion]; Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990). For historical analyses, see Michael W. McConnell, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1409 (1990); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An 
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
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curriculum requirements to church-operated schools;10 zoning and 
historic preservation regulation;11 and the licensing and regulation of 
religiously affiliated social services programs.12 However, while 
clashes between churches13 and regulators are recurring, one finds 
fewer scholarly works addressing the free exercise rights of religious 
groups and much less guidance from the Supreme Court. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has, surprisingly, never directly addressed the 
scope of free exercise protections when government regulation 
interferes with the internal affairs of religious groups. The Court has 
addressed claims for tax exemptions,14 but none of these cases has 
involved government action that directly impinges on internal 
church operations. 
While no case has addressed this issue directly, Supreme Court 
precedents involving religious groups provide support for three very 
different approaches.15 On the one hand, there is some support for a 
broad right of “church autonomy”16 that prohibits government 
interference with internal church affairs regardless of whether the 
activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane 
administrative matters. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions 
also support an approach that mirrors Smith’s rule for individuals. 
When government action is neutral and generally applicable, 
religious groups are not entitled to special relief even if the 
regulation burdens religious practices. In between these two options, 
a third approach provides limited relief where government regulation 
 10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 
1985); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981); State v. 
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). 
 11. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 
1990); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Soc’y of Jesus v. 
Boston Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); First Covenant Church v. City of 
Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
 12. For a discussion of cases in this area, see Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of 
Religiously Based Social Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 343 (1992). 
 13. I use the term “church” broadly to refer to both Christian groups as well as non-
Christian organizations. 
 14. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. Douglas Laycock popularized the use of this term in his influential piece, Towards a 
General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
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impinges on religious practice or activity. Under this middle 
position, religious organizations do not have a broad right of 
autonomy over all internal affairs, but they are entitled to exemptions 
from laws that burden religious practice. Each of these approaches 
can be found in lower court decisions, and each has its supporters in 
the legal academy. 
This Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith for 
guidance in choosing among these three options. The use of Smith 
as a prism through which to analyze the free exercise rights of 
religious groups makes sense for several reasons. First, no satisfactory 
account of religious group rights can be developed without 
evaluating the ramifications of Smith. While Smith dealt with 
protections for individuals, courts and scholars know that they must 
wrestle with the meaning of Smith in the group context. For some 
courts and scholars, the meaning of Smith for religious groups is 
simple: religious groups, just like religious individuals, are not 
entitled to special exemptions from neutral state action. For others, 
however, Smith is not relevant at all to the free exercise rights of 
religious groups, and they look to other lines of Supreme Court 
precedent for appropriate standards. My examination of Smith 
reveals that Smith is not only relevant to an analysis of religious 
group rights but is also very helpful for choosing among the three 
options outlined above. The opinion of the Court in Smith raises a 
number of issues that clarify what is at stake in making this choice, 
and its lessons are surprising. When read carefully, Smith supports a 
broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church 
affairs, the most religiously sensitive as well as the more mundane. 
II. THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the 
protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when government 
regulation interferes with church affairs, a number of the Court’s 
decisions provide guidance. The earliest source of guidance is a series 
of cases regarding intrachurch disputes over property.17 These 
 17. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for 
the United States and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Md. and Va. Eldership of 
the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); 
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decisions span over one hundred years, and within them, one finds 
arguments for all three approaches to religious group rights outlined 
above. Several other Supreme Court cases also bear on this issue, and 
they too have left the choice between these approaches unresolved. 
In this section, I will examine these Supreme Court decisions and the 
support they provide for each of these approaches. I will then 
examine two lines of lower court cases that reflect these different 
possibilities, and I will observe the same split among legal scholars. 
A. Supreme Court Case Law 
The first time that the Supreme Court addressed an intrachurch 
dispute over property was in Watson v. Jones,18 decided in 1872. The 
litigation in Watson arose when divisions over slavery and loyalty to 
the federal government resulted in a schism within the Presbyterian 
Church in the United States after the Civil War.19 The General 
Assembly, which functions as the highest judicatory in Presbyterian 
polity, had supported the union and opposed slavery; after the war 
ended, the General Assembly sought to enforce these views among 
church members.20 The General Assembly’s policy resulted in a split 
that affected the local congregation of the Walnut Street Church in 
Louisville, Kentucky.21 As the congregation’s members divided over 
support for the General Assembly, both factions claimed ownership 
of the church’s property.22 One of the factions sued in federal court 
based on diversity of citizenship, and on appeal, the Supreme Court 
applied federal common law. While Watson long antedated the 
Court’s application of the First Amendment to the states, the Court 
was guided by what it described as “a broad and sound view of the 
relations between church and state under our system of laws.”23 
According to the Court, in America, “[t]he law knows no heresy, 
and is committed to the support of no dogma,”24 and individuals 
have the right to form voluntary religious associations for the 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
 18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
 19. See id. at 690–93. 
 20. See id. at 690–91. 
 21. See id. at 692. 
 22. See id. at 692–93.  
 23. Id. at 727. 
 24. Id. at 728. 
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expression, practice, and dissemination of any religious doctrine that 
does not violate “the laws of morality or property” or “infringe 
personal rights.”25 This freedom includes the right to create church 
tribunals for the resolution of contested questions,26 and when 
church members form a hierarchical polity, courts must defer to the 
highest of these tribunals on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or 
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” when disputes arise.27 Applying 
this rule, the Court held that the property of the Walnut Street 
Church belonged to the faction loyal to the General Assembly.28
The Court gave several reasons for its rule. First, when 
individuals join together to form churches with hierarchical forms of 
governance, they voluntarily agree to submit to the decisions of 
church tribunals on disputed questions.29 When courts defer to the 
highest judicatory of a hierarchical polity, they are deferring to the 
choice made by church members. Second, deference also respects the 
proper boundaries between church and state. Quoting with approval 
the opinion of a South Carolina court, the Watson justices stated: 
“The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil 
liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. 
On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion 
of the civil authority.”30 Finally, the Court observed that civil courts 
are “incompetent judges”31 of the intricacies of church teaching.32 If 
courts become embroiled in questions of faith and doctrine, they will 
“involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty.”33
Within the Watson opinion, one can find support for all three 
approaches to government regulation of church affairs discussed 
above. One may argue, for instance, that the right to form voluntary 
religious associations and to determine rules for church governance 
requires broad protection from neutral government regulation as 
well as judicial deference in religious controversies. Whenever state 
 25. Id. at 728–29. 
 26. Id. at 729. 
 27. Id. at 727. 
 28. See id. at 734. 
 29. Id. at 729. 
 30. Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 
S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (S.C. App. Eq. 1843)). 
 31. Id. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting German Reformed Church 
v. Commonwealth ex rel. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282 (1846)). 
 32. See id. at 729, 732. 
 33. Id. at 732. 
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laws interfere with church control over internal affairs, they infringe 
on this freedom. Indeed, as Professor Laycock has noted, 
government regulation “is in some ways a greater intrusion” on the 
church than judicial resolution of disputes because “regulation 
always imposes external rules.”34 A system of government that gives 
individuals the right to form religious associations, no matter how 
unorthodox, places church affairs beyond the competence of 
government. A broad right of church autonomy also best accords 
with the separationist views regarding church and state expressed in 
Watson. When the Court affirmed that in America, “religious liberty 
[is secured] from the invasion of the civil authority,”35 the justices 
were envisioning a sphere of institutional autonomy beyond the 
power of the state. 
A less expansive view of religious group rights is also consistent 
with the reasoning in Watson. When Watson requires judicial 
deference on contested “questions of discipline, or of faith, or 
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,”36 it may, indeed, require relief 
from government regulation that affects religious beliefs and 
practices, but such relief need not extend to matters that lack 
ecclesiastical or religious significance. If, for example, state regulation 
only affects secular aspects of church operations, religious freedom is 
not at issue and Watson has nothing to say. Moreover, a broad right 
of autonomy that extends to all aspects of church administration 
regardless of whether religious matters are implicated would be 
gratuitous favoritism that no other type of nonprofit or charitable 
organization enjoys. Watson supports limited protection when 
government regulation interferes with ecclesiastical matters or 
conflicts with church doctrine, but it does not support a broader 
right of church autonomy. 
The Watson opinion supports yet a third interpretation. Watson 
is a decision about the limitations of judicial review in cases of 
intrachurch controversies. It is not a case about neutral government 
regulation, and it does not require special protections for religious 
groups even when the state interferes with religious beliefs or 
practice. When courts address intrachurch disputes over property, 
 34. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1396. 
 35. Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harmon v. 
Dreher, 17 S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (S.C. App. Eq. 1843)). 
 36. Id. at 727. 
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they seek a peaceful resolution of the controversy that accords with 
the expectations of church members, and, thus, deference to the 
highest church tribunal in hierarchical polities makes sense. In this 
respect, the decision in Watson was not novel, nor were its 
underlying principles appropriate solely for religious organizations. 
Indeed, the Watson majority specifically stated at the outset of its 
opinion that it would be applying general principles applicable to all 
voluntary charitable associations.37
In cases involving neutral government regulation, additional 
state interests are at stake. When the government regulates, it does 
so to achieve legitimate, and often pressing, policy objectives. Special 
exemptions for religious organizations would undermine these 
objectives. Moreover, neutral government regulation of church 
affairs does not infringe the freedoms protected in Watson. The 
Court in Watson affirms the right of individuals to join together in 
religious associations and to create tribunals to settle contested 
questions of faith and doctrine. When the government imposes 
neutral regulation, rather than engages in the resolution of internal 
disputes, these tribunals have no role to play. Moreover, the freedom 
to determine internal church structures and governance does not 
imply a right to exemption from external rules that are the result of 
democratic decision making and that apply equally to all similarly 
situated associations. 
Subsequent intrachurch dispute decisions also support these 
multiple interpretations. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America,38 decided eighty years 
after Watson, the Court used some of its broadest language 
describing religious group rights. The Kedroff Court found in 
Watson “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power 
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of 
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”39 
According to Kedroff, this freedom has constitutional protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause.40 The Court expressly approved of 
Watson’s rule of deference in cases of internal church disputes41 and 
 37. Id. at 714. 
 38. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 39. Id. at 116. 
 40. See id. at 115–16. 
 41. See id. at 110–16, 120–21. 
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affirmed as well a “rule of separation between church and state.”42 
Drawing upon this separationist view, the Court identified a 
“[f]reedom to select . . . clergy”43 and an “ecclesiastical right [to] . . . 
choice of . . . hierarchy.”44 In addition, the Court spoke of 
protections for “church administration,”45 the “operation of . . . 
churches,”46 and “polity.”47 Thus, the Court seemed to come close 
to embracing a broad right of church autonomy over internal church 
administration and governance. 
The holding in Kedroff is, however, limited. The litigation in 
Kedroff concerned the right to occupy a Russian Orthodox cathedral 
in New York.48 After the Russian Revolution, the New York 
legislature had transferred control of the property from the central 
governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow to 
church authorities in America.49 The Kedroff Court held that the 
transfer of power from one church authority to another violated the 
First Amendment.50 Clearly, the Kedroff Court believed that 
intentional interference with church government is unconstitutional. 
However, Kedroff did not address neutral government regulation 
that inadvertently interferes with church administration. Moreover, it 
is not clear from the Court’s opinion how far the independence that 
it envisioned should extend. Protected aspects of church affairs 
include the choice of clergy and hierarchy, and other “matters strictly 
ecclesiastical,”51 but whether more mundane aspects of church 
governance receive similar protection is left unresolved. 
These ambiguities remain in more recent decisions. For example, 
in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada 
v. Milivojevich,52 the Court held that courts must defer to church 
tribunals on matters of polity and administration as well as faith and 
doctrine.53 However, like Kedroff, this case involved an intrachurch 
 42. Id. at 110. 
 43. Id. at 116. 
 44. Id. at 119. 
 45. Id. at 107, 117. 
 46. Id. at 107. 
 47. Id. at 117. 
 48. Id. at 95–97. 
 49. Id. at 97–99, 105–07.  
 50. Id. at 110, 119. 
 51. Id. at 119. 
 52. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 53. Id. at 710. 
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dispute, not neutral government regulation, and the scope of 
protected matters of church government is unclear. Milivojevich 
involved “quintessentially religious controversies” over church 
discipline and the choice of clergy,54 as well as diocesan 
reorganization, an “issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”55 For 
matters involving less sensitive issues, the scope of First Amendment 
protection remains uncertain. 
The Court’s most recent intrachurch dispute case marks a 
substantial shift in the Court’s treatment of church controversies, but 
the same ambiguities remain. In Jones v. Wolf,56 decided in 1979, the 
Court held that courts may, but need not, employ the rule of 
deference developed in Watson. Instead of automatically deferring to 
the decision of the highest tribunal in hierarchical polities, courts 
may use “neutral principles of law” to resolve the dispute, or any 
other approach that does not require consideration of religious 
questions.57 Under the neutral-principles approach, courts use 
secular principles of property and trust law to examine the language 
of deeds, church charters or constitutions, state statutes, and any 
other relevant documents.58 Only when the interpretation of these 
documents would require courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions 
must courts defer to the decisions of religious bodies.59 The 
advantage of this approach is that it “free[s] civil courts completely 
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and 
practice.”60
At first glance, the Court’s decision in Wolf seems to undermine 
the free exercise protections established in earlier cases. In Wolf, the 
Court’s priority appears to be avoiding judicial entanglement in 
religious questions. As long as there is no danger that courts will 
become embroiled in doctrinal issues, the Court indicates that any 
one of a number of approaches to intrachurch disputes may be 
 54. Id. at 720; see also id. at 717 (“Nor is there any dispute that questions of church 
discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern 
. . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 721. 
 56. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 57. Id. at 602. 
 58. Id. at 600–04. 
 59. Id. at 604. 
 60. Id. at 603; see also id. at 605 (“The neutral-principles approach . . . obviates entirely 
the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church 
property disputes.”). 
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permissible.61 The dissent in Wolf observes that applying neutral 
principles of law, or another of these permissible approaches, may 
well result in overturning the decision of church hierarchies.62 
According to the dissent, such an outcome would interfere with the 
free exercise of religion.63 In the view of many scholars, the lesson for 
church organizations facing neutral government regulation is that 
such regulation will be sustained as long as its application does not 
require the examination of religious questions.64 Because neutral 
regulations are, by definition, secular standards, such entanglement 
will not occur often. Churches do not have an independent right to 
be free from government interference that does not involve state 
bodies in religious matters. 
A second look at Wolf, however, reveals other possible 
interpretations of the majority’s decision. The Court in Wolf was 
careful to point out that the advantages of the neutral-principles 
method are not limited to nonentanglement. The use of neutral 
principles of law permits courts to avoid entanglement in 
ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise 
values.65 Through appropriate use of secular language and property 
concepts, religious organizations can specify the resolution they 
would prefer in the event of a dispute.66 In this way, the neutral-
principles approach “can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of 
church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the 
members.”67 While the dissent argues that the neutral-principles 
method undermines free exercise rights, the majority insists that 
“[n]othing could be further from the truth.”68 Thus, the majority’s 
 61. See id. at 602. 
 62. See id. at 613–14, 616 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 613–14, 616–17 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 64. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, The No-Harm Rule, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU. L. REV. 1099; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious 
Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 406–08 (1987); see 
also Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional 
Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 294 (1994) (“Jones v. Wolf sharply 
undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy 
upon religious organizations.”). 
 65. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603–04.  
 66. See id. at 603. 
 67. Id. at 604. Whether the neutral-principles approach will always work as envisioned 
by the majority in Wolf has been questioned by Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off.! Civil Court 
Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1881–86 (1998). 
 68. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605–06. 
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approval of the neutral-principles method arguably reflects a 
continuing commitment to the free exercise rights of religious 
organizations as well as entanglement concerns. Such a commitment 
to free exercise is consistent with protections from neutral state 
regulation as well, either in the form of a broad right of church 
autonomy or more limited relief in situations where religious beliefs 
or practices are burdened. 
Indeed, in its earlier decision in Presbyterian Church in the 
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church,69 the Supreme Court indicated that avoidance of judicial 
entanglement in religious doctrine itself serves free exercise values. In 
Hull, decided ten years before Wolf, the Court suggested for the first 
time that the use of neutral principles of law may be a permissible 
method for resolving church property disputes.70 Just as in Wolf, the 
Court in Hull appeared to give priority to entanglement concerns.71 
However, the reason that the Court gave for these concerns reflects a 
continuing commitment to free exercise. According to the Court, if 
courts become involved in resolving religious questions, “the hazards 
are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious 
doctrine.”72 The Court repeated this statement in Milivojevich.73 
Thus, it is, in part, free exercise values that demand 
nonentanglement. 
To the extent that other forms of government action, such as 
neutral government regulation, also intrude upon the free 
development of religious doctrine, the reasoning in Hull supports 
additional relief. Indeed, the reasoning in Hull goes even further. In 
Hull, the Court’s concerns were not limited to actual burdens on the 
free development of religious doctrine. The Court was also 
 69. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 70. See id. at 449. 
 71. See id. at 445 (noting that the state has a legitimate interest in resolving church 
property disputes but “[s]pecial problems arise . . . when these disputes implicate controversies 
over church doctrine and practice”); id. at 447 (explaining that the logic of Watson “leaves the 
civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property 
disputes”); id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property 
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious 
doctrine and practice.”); id. (concluding that the First Amendment “commands civil courts to 
decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious 
doctrine”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976). 
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concerned with the “hazard” or danger of such interference. If the 
danger of interference also raises First Amendment problems, 
arguably only a broad right of church autonomy would provide 
sufficient protection. Any time government regulation impacts 
internal church affairs, there is a real danger that the development of 
doctrine will be affected. Even where the regulation does not appear 
to touch upon matters of religious belief or doctrine, these hazards 
are present. 
A handful of other Supreme Court cases that address protections 
for religious organizations also lend support to the three approaches 
to government regulation found within the Court’s intrachurch 
dispute cases. For each approach, there is a decision that seems to 
favor it. However, like the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, none of 
these decisions squarely addresses the free exercise rights of religious 
groups. 
For example, in 1979, the same year that Wolf was decided, the 
Court seemed to approve a broad right of church autonomy in 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.74 The litigation in Catholic 
Bishop arose when unions of lay teachers at several Catholic 
secondary schools sought to bargain collectively with their diocesan 
employers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).75 The 
dioceses refused on the grounds that application of the Act would 
impinge on their control over the religious mission of the schools 
and, thus, violate the First Amendment.76 The Court agreed that 
application of the Act would give rise to serious constitutional 
questions.77 The Court identified the danger of entanglement in 
religious matters and also stated that “mandatory collective 
bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is 
defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former 
autonomous position of management.”78 Whether the Court meant 
to suggest that any government regulation that interferes with 
internal church affairs raises First Amendment problems is unclear, 
and the Court did not elaborate further upon this statement. 
Following its statement, the Court did observe that ensuing conflicts 
 74. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 75. See id. at 492–95. 
 76. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 77. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501–04. 
 78. Id. at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. 
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267 (Pa. 1975)). 
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between clergy-administrators and the National Labor Relations 
Board, and between administrators and union negotiators, would 
further entangle religion and government.79 Thus, it is possible that 
the Court simply meant that encroachment on church autonomy 
would exacerbate entanglement problems rather than raise an 
independent First Amendment problem. In any event, the Court in 
Catholic Bishop ultimately sidestepped resolving any constitutional 
questions and decided the case on statutory grounds. According to 
the Court, in view of the serious constitutional questions it 
identified, there must be a clear affirmative intent by Congress to 
cover the teachers under the NLRA before the Court would 
construe the Act to apply to them.80 Finding none, the Court 
declined to construe the Act to cover them and avoided resolving the 
First Amendment issues.81
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,82 
the Supreme Court seemed to support a different approach. The 
litigation in Dayton arose when Dayton Christian Schools 
(“Dayton”) refused to renew the contract of a female teacher, Linda 
Hoskinson, after learning that she had become pregnant.83 The 
stated reason was that mothers should be at home when their 
children are young.84 When Hoskinson threatened litigation based 
on state and federal antidiscrimination laws, the school terminated 
her because she failed to follow the “Biblical chain of command” in 
seeking relief.85 Hoskinson then filed a complaint with the Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission alleging gender discrimination in violation 
of state law.86 The school filed an action in federal court seeking to 
enjoin the administrative proceedings.87 The school argued that any 
investigation of Hoskinson’s claim or imposition of sanctions would 
 79. See id. at 503. 
 80. See id. at 501. 
 81. See id. at 507. 
 82. 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
 83. Id. at 623. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 622–23. 
 86. Id. at 623–24. 
 87. Id. at 624. 
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violate the First Amendment.88 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the 
school and granted the injunction.89 The Supreme Court reversed.90
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dayton was based on 
abstention grounds.91 According to the Court, Dayton will have an 
adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional arguments in the 
state proceedings.92 However, the Court also added that “however 
Dayton’s constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the 
Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating 
the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge . . . if only to ascertain 
whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for 
the discharge.”93 By making this statement, the Court seems to 
suggest that the outcome of Dayton’s constitutional claim may turn 
on whether Dayton’s decision to discharge Hoskinson was, in fact, 
religiously motivated or whether the professed religious reason was 
merely pretextual. If the school’s reason for the discharge was 
actually religious, constitutional relief might be appropriate, but if 
the school’s decision was not religiously motivated, the Court 
suggests that application of antidiscrimination statutes would be 
permissible. An investigation into the school’s motive would not be 
relevant if the Court believed that all regulation impinging upon 
church control over internal operations were unconstitutional. Thus, 
the Court seems to reject a broad right of church autonomy while it 
leaves open the possibility of narrower protections where 
government regulation interferes with religious belief and practice. 
One must be careful, however, not to read too much into the 
Court’s statement. The Court’s comment was brief and remains 
dicta. By resting its holding on abstention grounds, the Court did 
not resolve Dayton’s First Amendment claims. It is quite possible 
that upon full consideration of the constitutional issues involved, the 
Court would embrace broader protections than it seems to envision 
here. 
 88. Id. at 624–25. 
 89. Id. at 625. The Sixth Circuit’s decision can be found at 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 
1985). 
 90. See Dayton, 477 U.S. at 622. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 628. 
 93. Id. 
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In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,94 the Court again left the scope of free 
exercise protections for religious organizations unresolved. At issue 
in Amos was a provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
exempting religious organizations from the Act’s prohibition against 
religious discrimination in employment.95 The exemption permits 
religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in 
employment regardless of whether the employee engages in religious 
functions.96 While Congress had originally exempted only the 
organization’s religious activities, it broadened the exemption in 
1972.97 This expanded exemption was challenged on Establishment 
Clause grounds, and the Amos Court upheld the exemption for all 
nonprofit activities.98 According to the Court, legislatures do not 
violate the Establishment Clause by seeking to lift significant 
regulatory burdens on the ability of religious groups to define and 
carry out their religious missions.99 Even where it seems that only 
secular activities are involved, “it is a significant burden on a religious 
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict 
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.”100 The 
line between religious and secular activities is not clear, and an 
organization would “understandably be concerned that a judge 
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.”101 
The resulting “[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way an 
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious 
mission.”102
The Amos Court conceived of burdens on religious belief and 
practice broadly. Indirect interference with religious activity burdens 
a group’s religious mission just as direct intrusion on religious 
matters does. The Court also observed that the inability of judges to 
fully understand different religious beliefs may limit their capacity to 
 94. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 95. See id. at 329–30. This exemption appears in section 702 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-1(a). 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 97. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 332 n.9. 
 98. See id. at 330, 339. 
 99. See id. at 335–39. 
 100. Id. at 336. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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identify burdens on religious activity, and the Court concluded that 
broad legislative exemptions are permissible under the Establishment 
Clause. However, the Court did not address the scope of mandatory 
accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause; indeed, the Court 
expressly left the scope of free exercise protection unresolved.103 
Amos tells us what government may do to alleviate government 
interference with religious groups, but it does not tell us what the 
government must do. 
For many commentators, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith 
provides the most relevant guidance when neutral government 
regulation impacts the internal affairs of religious groups.104 Just as 
individuals are no longer entitled to special exemptions when neutral 
laws burden individual religious practice, religious groups also 
receive no special protections. When read in conjunction with Jones 
v. Wolf, Smith permits government regulation of churches where the 
regulations are neutral and generally applicable and their application 
would not entangle government bodies in religious questions. 
However, while this interpretation of Smith is certainly plausible, 
it is not the only possible reading, and the ambiguities discussed 
above remain. Smith addressed the free exercise rights of individuals. 
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not “relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law 
of general applicability.’”105 Under this reading, Smith simply did not 
address the scope of free exercise protections for religious groups. 
Thus, while Smith may mean a lot for religious group rights, it may 
also mean little or nothing at all. 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
These multiple interpretations of Supreme Court precedent are 
reflected in lower-court opinions. My discussion will focus on two 
related lines of cases. One line addresses the constitutionality of 
applying federal antidiscrimination statutes to the employment 
decisions of religious organizations. The second addresses the 
constitutionality of requiring religious organizations to bargain 
 103. See id. at 335–36. 
 104. See Brant, supra note 64, at 276–77, 280–81; Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1193–96. 
 105. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
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collectively under federal and state labor laws. I have chosen these 
cases for several reasons. First, many of the important scholarly works 
examining government regulation of religious groups have drawn 
upon decisions in these areas to develop and illustrate their 
arguments.106 Focusing on the same case law facilitates engagement 
with these scholars. Second, these cases reflect the full range of 
approaches to government regulation discussed above. Lower courts 
usually choose one of the three approaches that can be found in 
Supreme Court case law, and one can find lower-court cases 
illustrating all three approaches. 
Lower-court decisions addressing employment discrimination 
statutes generally support relief where these laws impinge upon the 
religious beliefs or practices of the organization. These cases usually 
reject a broad right of church autonomy that would extend to all 
aspects of church operations, and none favors the type of rule 
developed in Smith for individuals. They agree that religious groups 
are entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but 
only where religious matters are actually at stake. 
Most lower-court litigation challenging the application of 
employment discrimination laws to religious organizations involves 
allegations of gender or race discrimination under Title VII or 
allegations of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).107 While Congress has exempted religious 
groups from prohibitions against religious discrimination in 
 106. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical 
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); 
Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious 
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Laycock, supra 
note 16; Lupu, supra note 64; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious 
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); William P. Marshall & 
Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 
OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986). 
 107. Cases have also involved claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Werft 
v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), the Equal Pay Act, see Dole v. 
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian 
Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986), violations of the reporting requirements of Title VII, see 
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), and 
increasingly, sexual harassment suits under Title VII, see Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 
375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 
(9th Cir. 1999); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, No. CIV.A.03-2150-KHV, 2004 WL 
2429978 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 2004). 
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employment,108 federal statutes contain no exemptions for 
discrimination based on gender, race, age, or other factors unrelated 
to religion. Because almost all lower courts to address the issue have 
found that Congress expressed an affirmative intent to cover 
religious organizations within these prohibitions,109 the courts have 
been unable to avoid constitutional questions on statutory grounds, 
as the Supreme Court did in Catholic Bishop. 
Beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. 
Salvation Army,110 lower federal courts have uniformly carved out 
what has become known as the “ministerial exception” to 
employment discrimination statutes.111 The McClure court describes 
the relationship between a church and its minister as its 
 108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (exempting religious organizations from Title VII’s 
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment). 
 109. See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331 
(3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1394–95; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1365–66; Rayburn v. Gen. 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166–67 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. 
Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981). 
The exception is the Fifth Circuit, which has held that “Congress did not intend, 
through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the 
employment relationship between church and minister.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 
553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972). Later Fifth Circuit decisions have found that Congress intended 
to cover other employment relationships within religious groups. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 
F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). In Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 
F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that Congress 
intended coverage of religious institutions under the ADEA. Id. at 361 & n.2; cf. Weissman v. 
Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
congressional intent to cover religious organizations under the ADEA is unclear, but 
application of the Act to a temple administrator raises no serious constitutional questions). 
 110. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 111. For cases treating this exception, see Werft, 377 F.3d 1099; Elvig, 375 F.3d 951; 
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); Starkman, 198 F.3d 173; 
Bollard, 196 F.3d 940; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 
1994); Scharon, 929 F.2d 360; Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164; Pacific Press, 676 F.2d 
1272; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277; Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477; McClure, 460 F.2d 553; 
Patsakis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Am., 339 F. Supp. 2d 686 (2004); Powell v. 
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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“lifeblood,”112 an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern,”113 and a 
matter “both basic and traditional.”114 Later courts have described 
this relationship as “close to the heart of church administration,”115 a 
“critically sensitive position,”116 a “quintessentially religious” 
matter,117 a “pervasively religious relationship,”118 and a “strictly 
ecclesiastical matter[].”119 Employment decisions regarding clergy 
are a “core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with which the 
state may not constitutionally interfere.”120 Lower courts also agree 
that the ministerial exception applies even if there is no doctrinal 
basis for the discrimination.121 As the Fourth Circuit stated in 
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,122 in 
 112. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see also Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (same); Bollard, 
196 F.3d at 946 (same); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same). 
 113. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559; see also Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same). 
 114. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559. 
 115. Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1368; see also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (stating that the 
ministerial relationship is “close to the heart of the church”); id. at 949 (“A religious 
organization’s decision to employ or to terminate employment of a minister is at the heart of 
its religious mission.”); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278 (stating that ministerial duties “go to 
the heart of the church’s function”); McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (stating that the minister is at 
“the heart” of the church). 
 116. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (explaining that 
the church-minister relationship is a “sensitive area[]”). 
 117. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 
(1976)). 
 118. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1993); see also 
Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 119. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2000). 
 120. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946. The First Amendment is violated when government 
“trespasses on the most spiritually intimate grounds of a religious community’s existence.” 
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 121. See e.g., Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 
320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. 
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Balt. Annual 
Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 
772 F.2d at 1169. 
 122. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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“‘quintessentially religious’ matters, the free exercise clause . . . 
protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.”123
No court has limited the ministerial exception to ordained 
clergy. The exception covers all employees with ministerial 
functions.124 The determination of which employees perform 
ministerial functions has yielded more variation among the courts. 
The proper inquiry has been described differently by different courts, 
as some courts view ministerial functions more broadly than others. 
For example, in two early cases, the Fifth Circuit employed a narrow 
conception of clergy.125 The court described ministers as 
intermediaries between the church and its congregation or 
instructors in the “whole of religious doctrine.”126 More courts have 
followed the broader definition suggested by Bruce Bagni, who has 
identified ministers as those whose “primary duties consist of 
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a 
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and 
worship.”127 According to these courts, this inquiry is designed to 
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and 
pastoral mission of the church.”128 In other cases, the test used to 
determine who is a minister is much less clear.129
 123. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (citation omitted). The court continued: “In these 
sensitive areas, the state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it 
may supervise doctrinal content.” Id. 
 124. See Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 
83 F.3d at 461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168. 
 125. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 
1981); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 126. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 485; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283–85 (quoting and 
drawing on Mississippi College). 
 127. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1545, quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 
83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Powell v. 
Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 128. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn); Catholic 
Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (quoting Rayburn). 
 129. For example, in a recent opinion, the Ninth Circuit seemed to envision clergy 
narrowly as those who are “representatives” of the church, Bollard v. Cal. Province of the 
Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999), but the case did not require the court to 
examine the functions of any lay employees. In another recent decision, the Fifth Circuit 
employed a mélange of factors, including whether employment decisions are made largely on 
religious criteria, whether the employee performs ceremonies of the church, and whether the 
employee tends to the religious needs of the congregation. See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 
173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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Initially, courts based the ministerial exception on two grounds. 
The first was the balancing approach that the Supreme Court applied 
to individual free exercise claims prior to Smith. According to the 
courts, interference with the choice of clergy heavily burdens 
religious practice, and this burden is not justified by a sufficiently 
compelling state interest.130 Furthermore, employment decisions 
regarding clergy are quintessentially religious matters of church 
government protected from state interference under the Court’s 
intrachurch dispute decisions.131 Thus, the lower courts interpreted 
the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases to provide relief where neutral 
government regulation interferes with important religious aspects of 
church affairs. After Smith, lower courts have continued to apply the 
ministerial exception based on these intrachurch dispute cases.132 
According to these courts, free exercise protections for individuals 
and groups must be distinguished.133 Protections for individuals are 
now governed by Smith and are limited. Individuals are not entitled 
to exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that burden 
free exercise.134 However, in its intrachurch dispute precedent, the 
Supreme Court has articulated a different basis for relief where 
government interferes with the internal operations of churches.135 
The courts emphasize the statement in Kedroff that churches have 
the right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, 
matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine.”136
In addition to the ministerial exception, lower courts have also 
acknowledged the possibility of relief where employment regulation 
 130. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168–69; see also Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United 
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving Rayburn’s analysis). 
 131. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167–68; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 282; McClure 
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 359–60 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 132. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945–46; Combs v. 
Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348–50 (5th 
Cir. 1999); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350–51. 
 133. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303–04; Combs, 173 
F.3d at 348–49; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 348, 350–51. 
 134. See Combs, 173 F.3d at 348–49; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350. 
 135. See Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303–04; Combs, 173 
F.3d at 348–50; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350–51. 
 136. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 116 (1952), quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 800 n.*; Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303; 
Combs, 173 F.3d at 350; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 350. 
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conflicts with specific religious doctrines or practices. Such conflicts 
are rarely found because courts usually conclude that church doctrine 
does not support discrimination,137 but the courts have consistently 
affirmed the availability of such special protection. Initially, the 
courts’ analyses proceeded under the pre-Smith balancing 
approach.138 This same framework—indeed, the same balancing 
test—has been applied even after Smith.139
Stepping back from the details of these cases, what one observes 
among the lower courts is limited protection for religious groups 
where government regulation burdens religious belief or practice. 
Where government regulation interferes with the organization’s 
choice of clergy, it, by definition, burdens religion. In the words of 
the D.C. Circuit, the “determination of ‘whose voice speaks for the 
church’ is per se a religious matter.”140 In cases involving 
nonministerial employees, a conflict between religious doctrine and 
secular employment standards must be established. In either case, 
however, courts have only granted relief in cases where religious 
matters are impinged. The courts have not recognized a broad right 
of church autonomy governing all aspects of church operations. 
They repeatedly distinguish regulations interfering with religious 
matters from those that touch only secular operations.141 It is not 
 137. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC 
v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Bollard v. Cal. 
Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Catholic 
Church’s Jesuit Order does not support sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII); Dole v. 
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that church 
members do not believe that the Bible mandates a pay differential based on gender). 
 138. See, e.g., Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397–98; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1367–69; Pacific 
Press, 676 F.2d at 1279–81; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 286–87. 
 139. See, e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946, 948 (applying the Sherbert balancing test where 
the facts did not support the application of the ministerial exception); see also Elvig v. Calvin 
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959, 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that even when 
the ministerial exception does not apply, a church may invoke First Amendment protections 
for actions based in religious doctrine). 
 140. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting district court below, 699 F. Supp. 954, 955 (D.D.C. 1988)); 
see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 805 (quoting Minker); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949 (same); Scharon 
v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (same). 
 141. See e.g., Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947–48; Shenandoah, 899 F.2d at 1397–98; Minker, 
894 F.2d at 1358; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1368–69; Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279–80; 
Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284–85; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. 
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intrusion on church matters alone that is unconstitutional. The 
impact of regulation on the organization may be substantial but still 
permissible. The “relevant inquiry is not the impact of the statute 
upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the 
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”142 As the 
Ninth Circuit has explained, “while we recognize that applying any 
laws to religious institutions necessarily interferes with the unfettered 
autonomy churches would otherwise enjoy, this sort of generalized 
and diffuse concern for church autonomy, without more, does not 
exempt them from the operation of secular laws.”143 Rather, the 
employment decision at issue must involve either a “protected 
choice,” such as the choice of clergy, or a “doctrinal” justification.144
One also observes that lower courts in the employment area have 
uniformly rejected the rule in Smith as the standard for religious 
group rights. The courts have limited Smith to cases involving 
individual free exercise rights, and they have turned instead to the 
Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute precedent for guidance.  
By contrast, in cases addressing the application of labor statutes 
to religious organizations, courts have been more willing to adopt 
the approach in Smith. Lower-court case law in this area has been 
shaped significantly by the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic 
Bishop. Recall that the Court in Catholic Bishop construed the 
National Labor Relations Act to exclude lay teachers at religiously 
affiliated schools.145 According to the Court, application of the Act in 
this context would give rise to serious constitutional questions, and 
in the absence of clear congressional intent to cover the teachers, the 
Court declined to construe the Act to include them. Catholic Bishop 
was decided in 1979, and in the decade following that decision, 
lower federal courts narrowed the scope of the Supreme Court’s 
decision as they applied the Act to religiously affiliated social services 
organizations such as hospitals,146 nursing homes,147 homes for 
Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 142. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Fremont, 781 
F.2d at 1369 (quoting Mississippi College); Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1280 (same). 
 143. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948. 
 144. Id.; see also Elvig, 375 F.3d at 956, 964 (following Bollard). 
 145. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 146. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983); St. Elizabeth 
Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 147. See Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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neglected and troubled children,148 and day care centers.149 
According to these courts, no serious First Amendment problems 
arise in these contexts. Entanglement problems under the 
Establishment Clause are unlikely because the programs function just 
like secular charitable enterprises, and unlike schools, they do not 
involve the dissemination of religious doctrine.150 While these 
programs may be religiously motivated, their activities are primarily 
and essentially secular.151
Lower federal courts also found that requiring these social 
services organizations to bargain collectively under the Act would 
not give rise to free exercise problems. All of these decisions pre-date 
Smith, and like courts in the employment discrimination context, 
courts in the labor area analyzed the free exercise rights of religious 
organizations under the balancing approach that the Court had 
developed for individual free exercise claims. The courts concluded 
that the primarily secular character of the social services 
organizations ensures that mandatory collective bargaining under the 
Act will only minimally impact religious practices.152 The courts also 
observed that none of the churches operating these programs have 
religious objections to bargaining with unions.153 Moreover, any 
minimal burden will be outweighed by the government’s compelling 
 148. See Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 
345 (8th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981); see also 
Denver Post of the Nat’l Soc’y of the Volunteers of Am. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 
1984) (addressing church-operated programs for troubled children as well as programs 
providing shelter for women and children and a program for victims of crime). 
 149. See NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care Ctr., 763 F.2d 1 (1st 
Cir. 1985). 
 150. See Volunteers of Am., L.A. v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(addressing church-operated detoxification and resident recovery programs); Bar None Boys 
Ranch, 752 F.2d at 348–49; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 771–73; St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 
F.2d at 1140–42; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64–65. 
 151. See Volunteers of Am., L.A., 777 F.2d at 1390; Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d at 
348; Salvation Army, 763 F.2d at 6; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 772–73; St. Elizabeth Hosp., 715 
F.2d 1193, 1196; St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1441; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. 
Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64. 
 152. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; see also Bar None Boys Ranch, 
752 F.2d at 349 (finding that impairment of sectarian objectives or practices is unlikely); 
Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306–07 (“Although recognition of the union will impose some 
constraints upon Tressler’s operation of the [nursing] Home, direct religious conflict is neither 
inevitable nor probable.”). 
 153. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306. 
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interest in protecting worker rights and securing labor peace.154 As in 
the employment area, the courts repeated that “the relevant inquiry 
is not the impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact 
of the statute upon the institution’s exercise of its sincerely held 
religious beliefs.”155
More recently, state and lower federal courts have gone even 
further and upheld the application of state labor laws to lay teachers 
at church-operated schools.156 According to these courts, unlike the 
NLRA, the state labor provisions clearly cover teachers at religiously 
affiliated schools, and, thus, the constitutional issues avoided in 
Catholic Bishop must be addressed.157 These courts have uniformly 
found that mandatory collective bargaining under state law would 
result neither in excessive entanglement prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause nor in a violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause.158 In Catholic High School Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New 
York v. Culvert,159 the only case addressing collective bargaining 
under state law decided prior to Smith, the Second Circuit analyzed 
the free exercise claim under the Sherbert balancing approach.160 
According to the Second Circuit, collective bargaining under New 
York’s statute does not conflict with religious doctrine.161 Indeed, 
 154. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442–43; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 306–07. 
 155. St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting and citing EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Pacific 
Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 
940 F.2d 1295, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1991) (same) (upholding application of NLRA to 
nonfaculty employees at church-operated residential school for boys). 
 156. See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 
(2d Cir. 1985); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997); N.Y. State Employment Relations Bd. v. 
Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997); Hill-Murray Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992). 
 157. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1163, 1164 (noting that the New York State Labor 
Relations Act was amended in 1968 to bring employees of charitable, educational, and 
religious organizations within its scope); St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 713, 714 (observing that the 
New Jersey constitution guarantees persons in private employment the right to organize and 
bargain collectively); Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862 (stating that while the legislature did 
not consider application of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act to religious organizations, 
Minnesota’s rules of statutory construction clearly support their coverage). 
 158. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1166–71; St. Teresa, 696 A.2d at 585–602; Christ the 
King, 682 N.E.2d at 963–66; Hill-Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 862–64. 
 159. 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 160. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1169. 
 161. See id. at 1170. 
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the court observed that the Catholic Church has long supported 
unions and worker rights.162 The court also found that the state’s 
compelling interest in protecting the rights of employees and 
preserving labor peace outweighs any minimal burden on free 
exercise rights.163
After Smith, courts addressing the application of state labor 
provisions to religiously affiliated schools have uniformly adopted the 
rule in Smith. According to these courts, labor laws are neutral laws 
of general applicability, and, thus, religious organizations are not 
entitled to any special exemptions unless their claims fall within one 
of the few categories of cases in which Smith preserved the balancing 
approach.164 At first glance, the decision of lower courts to follow 
Smith in the labor area but not in cases involving employment 
discrimination may seem puzzling. However, this difference can, 
perhaps, be explained by the fact that the free exercise analysis in 
labor cases had always been narrower. Unlike cases involving 
employment discrimination laws, lower courts evaluating labor 
statutes never drew upon the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute 
cases for guidance.165 They relied entirely on the Court’s pre-Smith 
balancing approach. Even the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop 
made no reference to the Court’s intrachurch dispute decisions when 
it found that the application of the NLRA to church-operated 
schools would give rise to serious First Amendment questions. Thus, 
when Smith was decided, it is not surprising that the abandonment 
of the Court’s balancing test meant the adoption of the Smith rule. 
In the labor area, in contrast to the employment context, the lower 
courts did not have alternative precedent on hand to support 
continuing protections. 
In none of these labor cases, however, does one find a whole-
hearted commitment to the implications of Smith. For example, in 
New York State Labor Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 1170–71. 
 164. See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 721–22 (N.J. 1997); N.Y. State Employment 
Relations Bd. v. Christ the King Reg’l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960, 963–64 (N.Y. 1997); Hill-
Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 862–63 (Minn. 1992). 
 165. The Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishop had cited this line of precedent once, see 
Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1977), but the Supreme 
Court did not draw upon this precedent, nor have subsequent lower court decisions. 
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High School,166 the New York Court of Appeals purported to follow 
Smith when it rejected a Catholic high school’s objection to 
coverage under New York’s labor statute,167 but the court left open 
the possibility that relief might be granted in situations where the 
collective bargaining process actually impinges upon religious belief 
or practice.168 Likewise, in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. 
Hill-Murray High School,169 the Minnesota Supreme Court followed 
Smith when evaluating a Catholic high school’s First Amendment 
challenge to coverage under Minnesota’s labor statute,170 but the 
court then applied a balancing approach under the state’s 
constitution.171 Noting the Catholic Church’s traditional support for 
unions,172 the court found no violation of state free exercise rights as 
long as mandatory subjects of bargaining are restricted to wages, 
hours, and other secular terms of employment.173 In South Jersey 
Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus 
Church Elementary School,174 as well, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
followed Smith but also applied a balancing approach. The schools in 
that case had attempted to establish a “hybrid claim” involving the 
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with the freedom of association 
and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their 
children.175 Where such hybrid claims can be established, Smith 
preserves the balancing approach developed in Sherbert, but the New 
Jersey Court found no support for the schools’ associational or 
parental rights claims.176 Even so, the New Jersey court applied the 
Sherbert balancing test and found no free exercise violation.177 
According to the court, as long as mandatory bargaining is limited to 
 166. 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997). 
 167. See id. at 963–64. 
 168. See id. at 964, 966. 
 169. 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992). 
 170. See id. at 862–63. 
 171. See id. at 864–65. 
 172. See id. at 865. 
 173. See id. at 866 (“While Hill-Murray may have demonstrated that the application of 
the MLRA [Minnesota Labor Relations Act] interferes with their authority as an employer, 
they have not established that this minimal interference excessively burdens their religious 
beliefs.”). 
 174. 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997). 
 175. See id. at 721–22. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 722–23. 
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secular terms and conditions of employment, the state’s compelling 
interest in preserving labor peace and worker rights outweighs the 
burden on free exercise.178
While courts in the labor area have, perhaps, been reluctant to 
commit fully to the implications of Smith, lower courts in other 
contexts have more readily embraced Smith. While this Article 
focuses on legislative regulation in the labor and employment 
contexts, examples of such readiness may be found in cases applying 
secular tort standards to religious entities. Increasingly, courts are 
adopting the Smith rule in cases involving tort claims against 
churches whose clergy have engaged in sexual abuse of children or 
sexual misconduct involving adults. These courts have held that 
claims for negligent hiring and supervision of clergy and breach of 
fiduciary duty do not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the 
applicable tort principles are neutral rules of general applicability.179 
The Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases are distinguished on 
the ground that they prohibit entanglement with religious doctrine, 
not application of neutral government rules.180 According to a recent 
decision by the Florida Supreme Court, “[t]o hold otherwise and 
immunize the Church Defendants from suit could risk placing 
religious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions, 
a concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment.”181
So far my discussion of labor and employment cases has included 
illustrations of two of the three approaches to government regulation 
of religious groups that can be found in Supreme Court precedent. 
Courts addressing employment discrimination statutes have provided 
relief where the government burdens religious belief and practice. In 
the labor context, courts after Smith have taken a different approach 
and have held that religious organizations are not entitled to special 
exemptions from neutral regulation even if the government interferes 
 178. See id. at 712, 716–17, 722–23. 
 179. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 
144–45 (D. Conn. 2003); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 73–74 
(D. Conn. 1995); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 
347, 354, 361, 364 (Fla. 2002). But see Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 
A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997) (“To import agency principles wholesale into church governance 
and to impose liability for any deviation from the secular standard is to impair the free exercise 
of religion and to control denominational governance. Pastoral supervision is an ecclesiastical 
prerogative.”). 
 180. See Doe, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 363–64. 
 181. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 365. 
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with religious matters. No case has yet to adopt the third approach 
and establish a broad right to autonomy over all internal operations. 
There are, however, several decisions approving the ministerial 
exception that have used language consistent with such a right. 
Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit first carved out the ministerial 
exception in McClure v. Salvation Army,182 the court used broad 
language to describe the rights of religious organizations. The court 
began by recalling that the First Amendment “has built a ‘wall of 
separation’ between church and State.”183 The court then turned to 
the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, which, in the court’s 
words, “place matters of church government and administration 
beyond the purview of civil authorities.”184 The court repeated the 
statement from Kedroff that this line of cases “radiates . . . a spirit of 
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular 
control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.”185 The Fifth Circuit expressly limited its 
decision to the church-minister relationship,186 and it never stated 
that all matters of church administration, no matter how secular or 
mundane, are protected by the First Amendment. However, the 
court left open that possibility, and its broad language easily lends 
support. 
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases decided shortly after McClure 
interpreted McClure and the ministerial exception narrowly.187 
According to these cases, only where there is an actual burden on 
religious beliefs and practice is protection warranted.188 However, 
broad language reappears in later cases, most prominently in the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in EEOC v. Catholic University of America189 
 182. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 559. 
 185. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 116 (1952), quoted in McClure, 460 F.2d at 560. 
 186. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. 
 187. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Southwestern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 125–26. 
 188. See Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 488 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not the impact of the 
statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the institution’s exercise of its 
sincerely held religious beliefs.”). 
 189. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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and the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Combs v. Central Texas 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.190 Within the 
Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, the D.C. Circuit found a 
“constitutional right of a church to manage its own affairs free from 
government interference”191 and “affirmation of a church’s 
sovereignty over its own affairs.”192 The court “agree[d] with the 
Fifth Circuit [in McClure] that ‘throughout these opinions there 
exists a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation.’”193 Churches 
have the “freedom to decide how [they] will govern [themselves]”194 
and a “constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own domain.”195 
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Combs wrote of the “fundamental right 
of churches to be free from government interference in their internal 
management and administration.”196 Secular authorities may not 
“insert[]” themselves into “the internal management of a church,” 
which is “a realm where the Constitution forbids [them] to tread.”197 
Like the McClure court, the court in Combs recalled the 
“constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and 
state.”198
Neither the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University nor the Fifth 
Circuit in Combs stated that the protected realm of church affairs 
extends to all matters, secular and religious alike, and their holdings 
were limited to affirming the right of churches to make employment 
decisions regarding ministers free from government interference. 
However, neither court restricted the protected area to the choice of 
clergy, and the language and spirit of these opinions seems to go 
much further. These cases leave open the possibility of a broad right 
of church autonomy and, indeed, provide the supporting framework. 
 190. 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 191. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460. 
 192. Id. at 463. 
 193. Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 
460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))). 
 194. Id. at 463. 
 195. Id. at 467. 
 196. Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 197. Id. at 350. 
 198. Id. at 351. 
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C. Scholarly Views 
The same split that appears among lower court opinions is also 
found in scholarly literature addressing the rights of religious 
organizations. The most prominent defense of a broad right of 
church autonomy has been made by Douglas Laycock.199 According 
to Laycock, the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, its 
decision in Catholic Bishop, and its commitment to nonentanglement 
all support a strong “right of church autonomy” under the Free 
Exercise Clause.200 Laycock argues that “churches have a 
constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions 
free of government interference,”201 and this right “extends to every 
aspect of church operations,” including “to routine administrative 
matters.”202 According to Laycock, government regulation need not 
burden religious beliefs or practices to violate the First 
Amendment;203 any interference with “church control of church 
institutions”204 is prohibited. The right of church autonomy is 
essentially a right “to be left alone.”205
Of course, Laycock recognizes that a right to church autonomy 
cannot be absolute.206 There must be some limits to protect 
nonmembers and even members in truly compelling circumstances. 
While I will be defending a broad right of church autonomy in this 
Article, I will not be tackling the difficult issue of where these 
limitations lie. However, some general observations are helpful. First, 
any limitations on the right of church autonomy must be drawn 
narrowly and must identify with specificity the permissible areas of 
government regulation. As is seen from the labor cases discussed 
above, courts applying the pre-Smith balancing approach readily 
found compelling state interests to justify government regulation. 
Lower federal courts upholding the application of labor statutes to 
 199. See Laycock, supra note 16; see also Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church 
Autonomy as Part of Free Exercise of Religion, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS 
AFFAIRS, II, at 28 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986). 
 200. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1394–98; Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy, supra 
note 199, at 32–34. 
 201. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1373. 
 202. Id. at 1398. 
 203. See id. at 1373, 1398. 
 204. Id. at 1394. 
 205. Id. at 1376. 
 206. See id. at 1394. 
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religious employers identified the government’s interest in preserving 
labor peace and protecting worker rights.207 Given the small number 
of religious employers in the overall economy and the fact that the 
National Labor Relations Board had for decades declined jurisdiction 
over nonprofit institutions, religious and nonreligious alike,208 the 
existence of such a compelling state interest in the context of 
religious employers was doubtful. 
Thus, instead of a general compelling state interest test that 
leaves outcomes uncertain, limitations on the right of church 
autonomy should take the form of narrowly tailored restraints in 
specific areas where government regulation is appropriate. When 
identifying these areas and restrictions, the strong presumption must 
be in favor of freedom for religious groups. For example, one area of 
appropriate regulation would be protections for outsiders. Religious 
organizations can be held liable upon their valid contracts, and tort 
liability is also appropriate where there are injuries to outsiders.209 
Contracts between religious groups and their members or employees 
should also be enforceable if the language and circumstances of the 
agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that the 
contract was civilly enforceable.210 However, the contract terms must 
be clear and capable of interpretation without involving the courts in 
religious questions. In addition, courts should avoid adjudicating 
contract claims involving ministers unless the agreement expressly 
provides for such secular enforcement. 
Regulations designed to protect the health and safety of 
members and employees would also be appropriate where death or 
serious bodily harm is threatened.211 Slightly broader protections 
 207. See supra notes 154, 163, 178, and accompanying text. 
 208. The Board began asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations in the early 
1970s and shortly thereafter adopted the same jurisdictional standards for nonprofit and for-
profit organizations. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective 
Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49 VILL. L. 
REV. 77, 152 & n.450, 162–63 (2004). 
 209. Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1406. 
 210. Laycock would require clear evidence that the church desires secular adjudication. 
See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1404 & n.238; Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, 
Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1468 (1988). My 
suggestion is slightly different. Even if organizational consent to secular adjudication cannot be 
established, contracts with members or employees would be civilly enforceable if the language 
and circumstances of the agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that such 
adjudication was contemplated. 
 211. Again, Laycock agrees. See Laycock, supra note 16, at 1406, 1417. 
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may be permissible for children and for adults whose impaired 
mental or physical condition makes them especially vulnerable to 
exploitation. Thus, tort liability for inadequate supervision of church 
employees would be appropriate where clergy engage in sexual abuse 
of minors or sexual misconduct with vulnerable adults. However, in 
keeping with the strong presumption in favor of organizational 
freedom, such liability for inadequate supervision should probably be 
limited to cases in which church officials acted recklessly rather than 
merely negligently,212 and liability with respect to the hiring or 
retention of clergy should be prohibited altogether. Protection of 
child welfare may also justify regulation in the context of church-
operated schools, but such regulations must also be narrow and 
limited. States might, for instance, require church-operated schools 
to demonstrate that students achieve at minimum levels of 
proficiency on standardized tests, but direct regulation of 
educational programs should be prohibited. In addition, where 
religious organizations hold themselves out as providers of 
professional services such as legal advice or medical care, they can be 
required to meet generally applicable professional standards. 
These examples are not designed to be definitive or exhaustive. 
My purpose, rather, has been to illustrate several important points. 
First, the right of church autonomy is strong, but it is not absolute. 
In some circumstances, regulations protecting church members and 
nonmembers are appropriate, but these circumstances are narrow 
and limited. Second, there is no simple test to identify when 
regulations are permissible and when they are not. Depending on the 
area of government regulation, the appropriate restrictions on the 
right of church autonomy may be different. Vigorous protection of 
religious organizations requires careful delineation of the rules 
appropriate in each context. 
Whether the receipt of government aid justifies greater 
regulation is a separate but very important question. Certainly, 
 212. If claims for negligent supervision are permitted, the result will be the imposition of 
secular standards of care on organizations that may have their own highly developed 
procedures and practices for clergy oversight and discipline. Where such secular standards 
displace practices that reflect the group’s religious values or traditional understandings of 
organizational structure and responsibility, the interference will be great. Such interference is 
appropriate where the organization’s leaders have acted recklessly, but organizational freedom 
should, arguably, prevail where the group’s leaders have been well-intentioned and have not 
acted recklessly. 
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lawmakers and funding agencies can require religious organizations 
to account for their expenditures of public funds in order to ensure 
that these funds are spent for the intended purposes and programs. 
Scholars debate whether the government may go further and apply 
regulations designed to shape the internal practices of funded 
organizations in the direction of public values.213 This question has 
become more pressing in recent years. While the social services 
programs of many religious denominations have long received 
significant amounts of government aid, until recently, Supreme 
Court precedent placed substantial limitations on aid to programs 
suffused with religious purpose and function. In the last few years, 
however, the Supreme Court has revised its Establishment Clause 
doctrine to permit greater aid to these types of religious 
organizations,214 and the current Bush administration has been 
pushing hard for increased funding for faith-based organizations, 
including organizations with significant religious identity and 
activity.215
The extent to which government funding may justify greater 
regulation of religious groups is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
the basic principles I develop here provide the necessary foundation 
for addressing this issue. If, as I argue, a broad right of church 
autonomy benefits not only religious groups but also the larger 
community by protecting alternative visions for social and political 
life, regulations designed to shape internal practices according to 
prevailing public values would be shortsighted and illegitimate. 
Permissible regulations would instead focus largely on ensuring 
 213. For articles engaging this debate, see Symposium, Public Values in an Era of 
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003); see also Steven K. Green, Religious 
Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 
(2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and 
the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 972–82 (2003). 
 214. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher aid to 
religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that church-operated 
schools may receive secular educational equipment and materials under a neutral direct aid 
program). 
 215. See Mike Allen, Bush Presses “Faith-Based” Agenda; President Proposes Regulations To 
Ease Federal Funding, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A10; Alan Cooperman, Grants to 
Religious Groups Top $1.1 Billion; Administration Lauds Initiative, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 
2004, at A27; see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2003: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS i–ii (2003). 
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accountability when public funds are expended and protecting 
recipients from coercion, abuse, and exploitation. 
While Laycock and a few other scholars have supported a broad 
right of church autonomy,216 a greater number of scholars have 
favored the path taken by lower courts in the employment 
discrimination area. Like courts that have carved out the ministerial 
exception, some of these scholars have identified certain aspects of 
church administration that should receive special protection under 
the First Amendment. For example, Bruce Bagni has argued that the 
“purely spiritual” matters at the “core or heart” of the church should 
be protected from government regulation except where the state’s 
interest is truly compelling.217 According to Bagni, these matters are 
the “spiritual epicenter” of the church, and within this epicenter, 
Bagni includes the relationship between church and minister, 
membership policies, religious education, worship, and ritual.218 
Where activities lie outside this epicenter, they can be regulated in 
proportion to their degree of secularity.219
Carl Esbeck supports a similar distinction under the 
Establishment Clause. Esbeck envisions the Establishment Clause as 
a “structural restraint on governmental power”220 that bars the 
government from intruding on “inherently religious”221 matters. 
These matters include those “exclusively religious activities” at the 
core of the organization’s religious identity,.222 such as worship, 
teaching, propagation of the faith, doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, 
 216. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27–
28; Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 
158–61 (1986); cf. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1018 (1989) (arguing that the institutional 
separation required by the Establishment Clause prohibits government from interfering in the 
internal affairs of religious organizations). 
 217. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1539. 
 218. Id.  
 219. See id. at 1540. 
 220. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1998). 
 221. Id. at 109; Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid 
Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285, 
309 (1999).  
 222. Esbeck, supra note 220, at 109; see also Esbeck, supra note 106, at 381 (arguing 
that government may not interfere with “matters central to [the] religious identity and 
mission” of religious societies); id. at 402 (arguing that “core religious activities” should 
receive special protection). 
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church discipline, membership rules, and personnel decisions 
regarding clergy and other employees chosen on the basis of 
religion.223 According to Esbeck, within this “domain,” churches 
have a “sphere of autonomy” that is outside the competence and 
jurisdiction of the state.224 With respect to matters that are not 
inherently religious, such as some aspects of social services work, the 
Establishment Clause permits regulation,225 though even here “[a] 
special wariness should characterize the relationship.”226
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also draw upon the Establishment 
Clause and envision a “zone”227 of religious activity that is beyond 
the competence and jurisdiction of government.228 This area of 
“ecclesiastical immunity”229 consists of the “aspects of the behavior 
of religious institutions that are bound up with the sacred,”230 and 
includes matters such as the employment of clergy,231 worship,232 and 
organizational polity.233 According to Lupu and Tuttle, when 
“religious institutions act in uniquely religious ways, making 
connections with the world beyond the temporal and material 
concerns . . . of the state,” they are protected from government 
interference.234 On the other hand, where the functions of religious 
institutions resemble other nonprofit organizations, Lupu and Tuttle 
favor a rule of neutrality that treats religious and nonreligious 
institutions alike.235
Each of these scholars draws a line between specially protected 
religious activities and activities that do not receive special treatment. 
 223. See Esbeck, supra note 220, at 10–11, 44–45, 109; Esbeck, supra note 106, at 376, 
397, 420; Esbeck, supra note 221, at 308. 
 224. Esbeck, supra note 220, at 77. 
 225. See Esbeck, supra note 221, at 304–05; Esbeck, supra note 220, at 79; Esbeck, 
supra note 106, at 377–78. 
 226. Esbeck, supra note 106, at 378. 
 227. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 83. 
 228. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at  83–84, 91–92; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1807 (citing 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 92). 
 229. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1807. 
 230. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 84; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 
1806. 
 231. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 91; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1810. 
 232. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 228, at 1806–07. 
 233. See id. at 1808. 
 234. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 92. 
 235. See id. at 78–79, 92. 
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Those matters that are quintessentially or inherently religious are 
accorded strong protection from government intervention, but other 
practices can be regulated. Thus, religious organizations receive 
some relief from state regulation, but the areas of relief are limited.  
Other scholars favor the balancing approach developed by the 
Supreme Court prior to Smith. For example, in an article written in 
1986, William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren favored free exercise 
protections where government regulation interferes with religious 
practices or conflicts with matters of church doctrine.236 Regulation 
of core religious activities like the employment of clergy would 
infringe upon free exercise,237 but so would other types of 
government interference with religious doctrine and practice. 
Marshall and Blomgren do not draw distinctions between 
quintessentially religious activities and those that are less religiously 
significant. 
The final approach to government regulation of religious 
institutions also has supporters in the academy. According to these 
scholars, religious organizations are not entitled to special 
protections from neutral government regulation even when religious 
practice is burdened. For example, Marci Hamilton argues that the 
rule in Smith should be extended to cases involving religious 
groups.238 In his earlier work, Ira Lupu also rejected special 
exemptions for religious organizations.239 Lupu’s defense of this 
approach predated Smith, and he drew upon the Supreme Court’s 
intrachurch dispute cases for support. In Jones v. Wolf, Lupu argued, 
the Court “made clear that the constitutional evil to be avoided” is 
not interference with organizational free exercise but entanglement 
with religious doctrine.240 While the Wolf Court did argue that the 
neutral-principles method it approved is consistent with free exercise 
values, religious organizations are afforded no special freedoms 
under this approach.241 The ability of religious organizations to 
 236. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 106, at 327. In more recent years, Marshall 
has been a leading opponent of free exercise exemptions, and he has defended the Court’s 
Smith decision. See Marshall, The Case Against, supra note 7; Marshall, In Defense of Smith, 
supra note 7. 
 237. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 106, at 327–28. 
 238. See Hamilton, supra note 64, at 1176–77. 
 239. See Lupu, supra note 64, at 395, 399, 431. 
 240. Id. at 407. 
 241. See id. at 407–08. 
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structure legal documents and transactions to ensure desired 
outcomes in the event of disputes is no different than the freedoms 
enjoyed by other corporate bodies.242
Lupu also observes that special protections for religious 
organizations would result in advantages that favor religious 
associations over secular ones.243 Many other scholars have found this 
type of favoritism troubling,244 and some scholars have also, like the 
Florida Supreme Court, discussed above, found such a “preferred 
position” problematic under the Establishment Clause.245 In 
addition, many scholars observe that the trend of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions is towards a neutralism that treats religious and 
nonreligious entities equally for Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause purposes.246 Smith embraced this neutralism in the free 
exercise field, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris.247 permitting religiously affiliated schools to 
participate in voucher programs embraced neutralism in the 
Establishment Clause field.248
Lupu makes an additional observation. The behavior of religious 
organizations, including a group’s internal practices, affects society at 
large. Religious institutions, “like other important social institutions, 
are influential in shaping behavior and moral convictions.”249 Thus, 
what goes on inside the institution has consequences for those 
outside of the organization, and exemptions from neutral, generally 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 401–03. 
 244. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1248; Gedicks, An Unfirm 
Foundation, supra note 7, at 556, 574; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 
7, at 927; Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 7, at 319–23. 
 245. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002). For a discussion of Malicki, see 
supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. For an example of scholarship that argues that 
special exemptions for religious organizations and individuals violate the Establishment Clause, 
see Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 7, at 320; Marshall, The Case Against, supra note 
7, at 388–94. 
 246. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion Clause Theory, 27 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (1997); Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 1870; Scott C. Idleman, 
Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 
252–53 (2000); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 68–71; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 213, at 
918–919. 
 247. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 248. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 213, at 918–19; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 
70. But see Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004) (reaffirming the distinctive 
treatment of religion under the First Amendment). 
 249. Lupu, supra note 64, at 408. 
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applicable government policies, such as antidiscrimination policies, 
may harm those outside the group.250 Church members are not the 
only ones who have an interest in internal church affairs,251 and 
special protections often come at the expense of the larger 
community.252
III. LESSONS FROM SMITH 
As the previous section demonstrates, Supreme Court precedent, 
lower-court case law, and scholarly writing leave us with three very 
different approaches to neutral government regulation that interferes 
with the internal affairs of religious organizations. In this section, I 
will identify the approach that I believe to be the most appropriate. 
As I noted in the introduction, I will be using the Smith decision as a 
prism through which to analyze the rights of religious organizations 
under the Free Exercise Clause. For some courts and scholars, Smith 
has nothing to say about free exercise protections for religious 
groups. Smith addresses only the rights of individual believers, and 
other precedents, such as the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, 
provide the standard for religious groups. For other courts and 
scholars, Smith means the same thing for religious groups as it does 
for individuals. Neither receive special protection when neutral 
regulation interferes with religious practice. In my view, neither 
interpretation is correct. The rule in Smith for individual believers is 
not the same standard that should apply to government regulation of 
religious groups. However, the analysis in Smith is not irrelevant to 
assessing the scope of religious group rights. To the contrary, Smith 
raises a number of issues that help to clarify what is at stake in 
choosing among the different options. When these issues are 
examined closely, the results are surprising. Smith supports a broad 
right of autonomy for religious groups that extends to internal 
matters with clear religious significance as well as activities that 
appear more mundane or secular. 
 250. See id. at 408–09. 
 251. See id. at 409. 
 252. See id. at 403. 
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A. Religious Groups and Freedom of Belief 
The first guidepost that Smith provides lies in the first few lines 
of the Court’s analysis where the Court draws a distinction between 
protections for religious beliefs and protections for religious action. 
According to Smith, the “free exercise of religion means, first and 
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine 
one desires.”253 Watson v. Jones expressed a similar view. In America, 
the “law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no 
dogma, the establishment of no sect.”254 Action receives less 
protection. While an individual is free to believe whatever he or she 
chooses, the Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee the right to act 
on these beliefs where neutral laws of general applicability stand in 
the way.255 An individual’s religious beliefs do not “excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the 
State is free to regulate.”256
According to the Court, greater protection for action under the 
balancing approach developed in Sherbert is problematic for several 
reasons. First, if a religious believer is entitled to an exemption 
whenever the government burdens religious conduct and the state’s 
interest is not compelling, the believer will “become a law unto 
himself,”257 and chaos will ensue.258 Such a rule is especially 
dangerous in a nation that includes and values diverse religious 
beliefs.259 Furthermore, the Sherbert balancing test unfairly privileges 
religious liberty over other constitutional rights.260 In other contexts 
such as the Equal Protection and Speech Clauses, compelling state 
interest analysis produces “equality of treatment and an unrestricted 
flow of contending speech”; here it would “produce a private right 
to ignore generally applicable laws[, which] is a constitutional 
anomaly.”261 In addition, limiting free exercise protection to burdens 
on religious practices that are central to the believer’s faith is 
 253. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 254. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872). 
 255. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79. 
 256. Id. at 879. 
 257. Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)). 
 258. See id. at 888. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. at 886. 
 261. Id. 
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unworkable.262 Judges are not fit to investigate and determine which 
beliefs are central in different religious traditions.263
While the Free Exercise Clause does not require individual 
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability, Smith does 
envision legislative relief.264 The Free Exercise Clause reflects a 
solicitude for religious liberty that can be expected from the 
democratic processes as well.265 The Smith Court points to and 
approves of the frequency of reasonable legislative 
accommodations.266 While the Court admits that minority religious 
practices will be at a “relative disadvantage” in this process, this is 
unavoidable and preferable to the anarchy that is threatened under 
the Sherbert approach.267
Thus, in the world that Smith envisions, the beliefs and actions of 
religious individuals are treated very differently. In the realm of ideas, 
Smith envisions unrestricted freedom. The Free Exercise Clause 
entitles individuals to believe and profess whatever doctrines they 
desire, and Smith expects that individuals will hold a wide range of 
different religious views, orthodox as well as unorthodox, popular 
and unpopular. Restrictions on religious practice are, by contrast, 
unavoidable, but Smith hopes that legislatures will make 
accommodations where reasonable. Moreover, Smith does not 
expect restrictions on action to affect the complexity and diversity of 
opinion. Religious individuals will continue to hold whatever 
religious beliefs they desire even if the beliefs are not actionable. In 
many cases, religious adherents will be successful in petitioning the 
legislature for relief from burdensome laws. Adherents of minority 
religions will be at a disadvantage in the legislative process, but they 
will not be absent. Their actions may be circumscribed, but their 
beliefs will be free. 
The Smith Court says little about the conditions that would be 
necessary to maintain the type of unrestricted freedom of belief that 
it envisions. The Court does state that the government may not 
regulate religious beliefs as such,268 and it also assumes that 
 262. See id. at 886–87. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. at 890. 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 877. 
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government regulation that impairs individual practice will not 
undermine the individual’s choice of belief. However, the Court 
does not elaborate further. Nor does Smith address the proper 
treatment of religious groups under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Further examination of both these issues reveals an important link 
between them. Religious groups play an indispensable role in 
shaping and fostering the freedom of belief that Smith envisions and 
is committed to. 
Numerous scholars have observed the connection between 
religious groups and individual religious convictions. Individuals 
express and exercise their beliefs in religious communities,269 and 
religious organizations also play an essential role in shaping the 
beliefs that individuals hold.270 As Frederick Gedicks has written, 
“[g]roups are ongoing and independent entities that influence in 
their own right how individuals think, express themselves, and 
act.”271 Thus, “[a]lthough in some respects groups are aggregations 
of their individual members, in other respects, groups are prior to 
and independent of their members.”272 Justice Brennan draws the 
same connection between individual religious belief and group 
activity in his concurrence in Amos.273 According to Justice Brennan, 
“[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large 
measure from participation in a larger religious community.”274 
These religious groups do not simply express individual religious 
beliefs, but the “community represents an ongoing tradition of 
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation 
of individuals.”275
 269. According to Carl Esbeck, “religious belief nearly always is expressed in some sort of 
communal way.” Esbeck, supra note 106, at 374. Similarly, Douglas Laycock observes that 
“[r]eligion includes important communal elements for most believers. They exercise their 
religion through religious organizations.” Laycock, supra note 16, at 1389. 
 270. See John H. Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 567, 580–81 (1990); see also Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry 
Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1842–43 
(2001) (arguing that religious groups are among the intermediate institutions that shape and 
form individuals). 
 271. Gedicks, supra note 106, at 107. 
 272. Id. 
 273. For discussion of Amos, see supra notes 94–103 and accompanying text. 
 274. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 275. Id. 
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Groups play yet another important role in the formation of 
individual belief. Religious communities are the vehicle for the 
development of doctrine. It is through religious communities that 
individuals jointly develop religious ideas and beliefs. Thus, the very 
formulation of religious opinions takes place within religious groups, 
as does the transmission and exercise of beliefs. Religious groups do 
not simply shape their members, nor do fellow congregants simply 
exercise preexisting convictions with like-minded believers. Rather, 
religious communities are part of an ongoing conversation that both 
shapes individuals and is shaped by them. In the sometimes rough 
and tumble of congregational and denominational life, individuals 
work together to define, refine, and reform religious ideas. Indeed, 
this process is not limited to single congregations or even single 
denominations. It takes place in a larger environment where religious 
groups and their members constantly interact with and influence one 
another. As communities face new circumstances and experiences, 
they may look to other groups for guidance, or they may sharply 
distinguish themselves, or they may do some of both. Individuals 
and subgroups may split, new communions may be formed, and old 
ones reformed. The lines that separate group from group are porous, 
and individuals, subcommunities, and ideas cross back and forth. 
Nor is the development of religious ideas and doctrine an 
abstract affair. Religious organizations do not simply teach or 
formulate doctrine in the abstract. They also seek to live out their 
beliefs in their relationships with fellow communicants. They seek to 
put their beliefs into action in shaping organizational structure, 
developing rules for church discipline, clarifying the rights and duties 
of members and employees, and fostering more informal social 
expectations and standards. Indeed, it is through this process of 
living beliefs in community that ideas are tested and, again, refined 
and reformed. It is also through this process that beliefs are 
preserved. Without the ability to put ideas into practice within the 
community, it would be difficult for the group to maintain its 
commitments and convictions. Indeed, without the opportunity to 
practice their convictions in community life, church members may 
not be able to fully understand what their beliefs mean and require. 
Restrictions on individual action outside the community may not 
undermine religious belief if these opportunities are present, but 
restrictions on internal group life could be devastating. 
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If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual 
religious belief and, indeed, in the very formulation of religious 
ideas, the freedom of belief that Smith envisions requires protections 
for religious organizations. If religious communities are not able to 
teach, develop, and live out their ideas free from state interference, 
individual belief will also be suppressed. The diversity of religious 
beliefs that Smith envisions presupposes a diversity of religious 
communities, each of which is able to structure its own internal life 
according to its own unique religious views and perspectives. 
Supreme Court precedent under the Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment provides support for such protection. The Supreme 
Court has long held that the individual’s freedom to engage in 
speech activities under the First Amendment requires a 
“corresponding right” to associate with others for those ends.276 The 
right of association is “implicit” in First Amendment protections for 
freedom of speech.277 Similarly, protections for religious groups are 
implicit in the Free Exercise Clause’s commitment to freedom of 
religious belief and profession. Full freedom of belief is not possible 
without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop, 
and practice their doctrines and ideas. 
Thus, of the three approaches to government regulation of 
religious groups that can be found in existing Supreme Court 
precedent, the rule in Smith for individual religious exercise is, 
surprisingly, the least compatible with the decision’s underlying 
principles. Special protections for religious organizations are 
necessary at least where government regulation interferes with 
religious belief or practice. Such protections would not give rise to 
the same risk of chaos that the Smith Court feared in the context of 
individual religious exercise.278 The exemption of individuals from 
neutral laws of general applicability whenever a burden is proved and 
a compelling state interest is absent may, indeed, be “courting 
anarchy.”279 However, the same danger does not arise when religious 
organizations are exempted from compliance with regulations that 
interfere with internal community life. Permitting religious groups to 
 276. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000); Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. 
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 
(1984). 
 277. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622. 
 278. See supra notes 257–59, 267 (discussing Smith). 
 279. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
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shape community practice according to shared norms may have a 
great impact upon the lives of members and employees, but any 
direct effect on the larger society will usually be minimal. Where 
outsiders would be harmed, limitations can be imposed as discussed 
above. Federal courts holding that the ministerial exception survives 
Smith agree. According to the D.C. Circuit, “the ministerial 
exception does not present the dangers warned of in Smith.”280 
Protections for the internal affairs of religious organizations do not 
“empower a member of that church, ‘by virtue of his beliefs, to 
become a law unto himself.’”281
Nor would special protections for religious organizations be 
inconsistent with the equality that Smith prescribes for individuals. 
For many scholars, Smith reflects the trend toward neutralism in the 
Court’s recent case law. In both the free exercise and establishment 
areas, the Supreme Court is increasingly treating religious individuals 
and entities like nonreligious ones.282 However, it is important not to 
read too much into the Smith decision. The Court in Smith did hold 
that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special exemptions for 
believers when neutral government regulations burden religious 
practice. However, the Court did not hold that believers and 
nonbelievers must always be treated alike. To the contrary, the Court 
permits and, indeed, encourages legislatures to make special 
accommodations when religious practice is burdened.283 Smith does 
not reject all special or favorable treatment of religion. Indeed, it 
 280. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 281. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))); see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
and approving Catholic University, 83 F.3d 455). The Eleventh Circuit has made a similar 
distinction: 
The Court’s concern in Smith was that if an individual’s legal obligations were 
contingent upon religious beliefs, those beliefs would allow each individual “‘to 
become a law unto himself.’” The ministerial exception does not subvert this 
concern; it was not developed to provide protection to individuals who wish to 
observe a religious practice that contravenes a generally applicable law. Rather, the 
exception only continues a long-standing tradition that churches are to be free from 
government interference in matters of church governance and administration. 
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 
2000) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. 
at 167)). 
 282. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text. 
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expects and approves of such favoritism. Protections for religious 
groups would be consistent, not inconsistent, with Smith. 
B. Misunderstandings and Temptations 
If special protections for religious groups are necessary to 
preserve the freedom of belief that Smith envisions, the next step is 
to determine how far these protections should extend. Does Smith 
call for a broad right of church autonomy, or should protections be 
limited to situations in which religious belief or practice is actually 
burdened? 
Certainly, religious groups should be entitled to relief where 
government regulation conflicts with specific doctrines or practices. 
The application of secular standards where such a conflict exists 
would impede the organization’s ability to preserve and develop 
doctrine. Indeed, in some cases, the effect of such application would 
be to inject the government directly into religious disagreements and 
decision making. For example, if Title VII’s prohibition against 
gender discrimination in employment were applied to ministerial 
decisions by religious groups, the government would be lending its 
support to one side in a long-running struggle within American 
congregations over the proper role of women in ministry. Those who 
favor female clergy would be heavily favored over those with more 
conservative views. Indeed, any time that government regulation 
addresses difficult social or moral issues that also divide church 
members, the imposition of the secular standard will disrupt the 
process by which the religious group develops its own doctrine and 
beliefs. Many Americans may approve of the results in cases where 
religious groups hold unpopular or outdated views. However, the 
First Amendment protects the freedom of individuals to hold these 
views, and religious groups are entitled to the protections that make 
such freedom possible. 
Protections for religious organizations could also be extended to 
areas of activity that scholars have identified as quintessentially or 
inherently religious.284 Placing matters such as the church-minister 
relationship, religious education, and worship outside the 
competence of government makes sense insofar as these aspects of 
church administration are closely related to the group’s religious 
 284. See supra notes 217–35 and accompanying text. 
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mission. As federal courts carving out the ministerial exception have 
argued, interference with such core religious matters by definition 
burdens religion.285
Whether courts should go further and recognize a broad right of 
church autonomy over all internal affairs is a more difficult issue. If 
religious organizations receive relief whenever there are identifiable 
burdens on religious exercise or whenever quintessentially religious 
matters are involved, would further protection be gratuitous 
favoritism that unfairly advantages religious groups over nonreligious 
ones? On the other hand, is a broad right of church autonomy 
necessary to fully protect the ability of religious groups to preserve 
and transmit their unique beliefs and ways of life? 
To answer these questions, one must look at another issue raised 
in Smith. One of the reasons given by the Smith majority for its rule 
regarding individual religious practice is the difficulty that judges 
would have in identifying which beliefs are central in different 
religious traditions. Providing relief whenever a believer’s religious 
conduct is burdened by government action would produce chaos, 
but limiting exemptions to situations involving practices central to 
the individual’s faith is unworkable. Judges do not have the ability to 
make such determinations: “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to 
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or 
the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”286 
If this concern is explored further in the group context, it becomes 
clear that limiting judicial relief to actual burdens on group belief or 
practice may be preferable in theory, but it is unworkable in fact. 
Judges are no more fit to make the types of inquiries required under 
such an approach than they are to identify which beliefs are central in 
different religious traditions. The danger that judges will 
misunderstand an organization’s beliefs and practices or be tempted 
to distort these beliefs in order to reach desired outcomes is 
considerable, whether the judge is trying to carve out specially 
sensitive areas of church life or attempting to ascertain whether 
government regulation conflicts with specific religious teachings. For 
both types of inquires, it is possible to point to numerous cases in 
which judges have inadvertently, and sometimes willfully, 
 285. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 286. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989)). 
1BRD-FIN 12/16/2004 12:33 PM 
1633] Religious Organizations and Free Exercise 
 1681 
 
misunderstood organizational belief. The result is significant 
impingement on religious doctrine and practice. The only reliable 
way to protect the religious beliefs and activities of religious groups 
is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of 
church affairs, even the most routine and mundane. 
The difficulty that courts have in ascertaining whether 
government regulation burdens specific religious beliefs or practices 
is illustrated well by cases in the labor and employment area. These 
cases demonstrate that judicial efforts to identify burdens fail for 
several reasons. For example, two federal circuit court opinions 
addressing instances of gender discrimination in church-operated 
schools illustrate the temptation that judges experience to misread 
church doctrine in order to reach desired outcomes. In EEOC v. 
Fremont Christian School,287 the EEOC sought to enforce Title VII 
and the Equal Pay Act against a conservative Christian school that 
offered health insurance to single employees and married men but 
not to married women.288 Fremont Christian School (“Fremont”) 
grounded its policy on biblical teaching that the husband is the head 
of the household in a marriage and is required to provide for the 
family.289 The Ninth Circuit rejected Fremont’s free exercise 
argument because it found that application of Title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act would not have a “significant impact”290 on the 
school’s beliefs and only minimal impact on practice.291 The court 
pointed to a statement made by the pastor of the church that 
operated Fremont. According to the pastor, “the Church, believing 
as it does, in the God-given dignity and the special role of women, 
could not, without sin, treat women according to unfair 
distinctions.”292 The court drew a connection between this statement 
and the facts of an earlier case in which it had applied Title VII to a 
religious organization that denied endorsing gender discrimination 
in employment.293 The court also noted that the school had 
abandoned its earlier practice of paying married men more than 
 287. 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 288. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 289. Id. at 1364. 
 290. Id. at 1368. 
 291. Id. at 1369. 
 292. Id. at 1368. 
 293. See id. (drawing on EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th 
Cir. 1981)). 
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married women and that it now offered the same life and disability 
insurance to both men and women.294
The court’s argument that application of the federal statutes 
would not significantly burden Fremont’s religious beliefs and 
practice is strained if not disingenuous. Application of these statutes 
would prohibit a practice with clear religious grounding and would 
prevent Fremont from recognizing the different roles of men and 
women in its employment policies. The court twists the words of 
Fremont’s pastor when it suggests that the church’s teaching does 
not support pay and benefit differentials between men and women. 
The pastor never stated, and indeed the church denied,295 that men 
and women should be treated equally in all respects. “Unfair 
distinctions” are prohibited, but not all distinctions. Fremont clearly 
believed that different roles for men and women in marriage make 
employment distinctions based on the husband’s role as head of the 
household both fair and appropriate. While Fremont chose to give 
women equal pay and insurance benefits, it had religious reasons for 
differential treatment regarding health benefits. For Fremont, the 
Bible provides clear support for a policy that is now prohibited by 
government regulation. The court essentially second-guessed the 
school’s understanding of its own beliefs and minimized the burden 
of government regulation on the school. 
The Fourth Circuit in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church.296 
made a similar mistake. Like Fremont, Shenandoah involved a 
conservative Christian school that gave special benefits to married 
men based on the biblical belief that the husband is the head of the 
household.297 The school was operated by the Shenandoah Baptist 
Church. Before salaries were increased across the board, Shenandoah 
paid married male teachers a salary supplement that was not provided 
to married women.298 The federal department of labor, joined later 
by the EEOC, sought to enforce the Equal Pay Act,299 and the 
Fourth Circuit held that application of the Act would not violate the 
 294. Id. at 1368. 
 295. Id. at 1364 (“Among the doctrinal beliefs held by the Church is the belief that, 
while the sexes are equal in dignity before God, they are differentiated in role.”). 
 296. 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 297. Id. at 1391–92. 
 298. Id. at 1392. 
 299. Id. at 1392–93. 
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Free Exercise Clause.300 As in Fremont, the court found that any 
burden on Shenandoah’s beliefs would be minimal.301 According to 
the court, “[t]he pay requirements at issue do not cut to the heart of 
Shenandoah beliefs.”302 Shenandoah did not claim that the Bible 
mandates a pay differential between men and women, and it had 
voluntarily phased out the supplement on its own.303 The court’s 
conclusion that application of the federal statute would not cut to 
the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs ignores the effect of its holding. 
Shenandoah believes that men and women have different roles in the 
marriage relationship and that these different roles authorize 
differential treatment in employment settings. Application of the 
federal statute would prohibit such differential treatment. While 
Shenandoah no longer pays men and women differently, it believes 
that such differential treatment is biblically based, and after the 
court’s ruling, it no longer has the freedom to use pay differentials. 
The court has, in effect, prohibited the church from living out beliefs 
with clear religious grounding. 
In Fremont and Shenandoah, the temptation to reach desirable 
results almost certainly contributed to judicial second-guessing of 
church doctrine and to minimization of the impact of government 
regulation on church life. In other cases, failure of courts to identify 
burdens on group practices and belief results from an unfamiliarity 
with church doctrines. The complexity of church doctrine and its 
development over time often makes ascertaining conflicts between 
government regulation and church doctrine particularly difficult. 
State and lower federal court cases upholding the application of labor 
statutes to church institutions illustrate these problems. 
Many of these cases have involved social services organizations or 
schools operated by the Catholic Church, and courts have repeatedly 
found that collective bargaining is consistent with Church 
doctrine.304 Indeed, in several cases, the courts have observed that 
 300. Id. at 1397–99. The court also rejected Shenandoah’s Establishment Clause claim. 
Id. at 1399. 
 301. Id. at 1397 (concluding that “any burden would be limited”). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 1397–98. 
 304. See, e.g., Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 
1161, 1170 (2d Cir. 1985); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, 1442–43 
(9th Cir. 1983); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 
865 (Minn. 1992). 
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the Catholic Church has long supported unionization and collective 
bargaining. According to the Second Circuit in Catholic High School 
Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert, “the Encyclicals and 
other Papal Messages make clear that the Catholic Church has for 
nearly a century been among the staunchest supporters of the rights 
of employees to organize and engage in collective bargaining.”305 
The court continued with the additional observation that the 
Church’s “strong commitment to social and economic justice and 
collective bargaining was recently affirmed in the . . . Catholic 
Bishops’ Pastoral Letter” on the economy.306 However, a more 
thorough analysis of the Catholic Church’s social teaching reveals 
that the Church’s views are far more complicated than these courts 
assume. While the Catholic Church strongly supports worker rights 
and collective bargaining, the Church’s vision of collective 
bargaining is very different from the framework established in the 
NLRA and state labor laws that resemble the federal statute.307
While secular statutes presuppose and entrench an adversarial 
relationship between management and labor, the Catholic Church’s 
goal is a cooperative relationship based on charity, mutual respect 
and concern, and the common good. In an earlier article on religious 
organizations and mandatory collective bargaining, I have discussed 
differences between the NLRA and the Church’s model in great 
detail and have identified several aspects of the national framework 
that conflict with Church teaching.308 For example, whereas the 
availability, threat, and actual use of economic weapons such as 
strikes and lockouts is “part and parcel”309 of the system that the 
NLRA sets up, the Church envisions a process of reasoned discussion 
 305. Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1170. 
 306. Id. The court was referring to NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE 
U.S. ECONOMY (10th anniversary ed. 1997) (1986). 
 307. The first state labor statutes were modeled on the NLRA as originally adopted in 
1935. See CHARLES C. KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS: A STUDY OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 1–2 (1948). The original version of the NLRA is commonly referred to as the 
Wagner Act, and these first state statutes are known as “little” or “baby” Wagner Acts. See 
SANFORD COHEN, STATE LABOR LEGISLATION 1937–1947: A STUDY OF STATE LAWS 
AFFECTING THE CONDUCT AND ORGANIZATION OF LABOR UNIONS 4 (1948). Later state 
statutes anticipated the amendments to the Wagner Act in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and 
helped to shape these changes. See KILLINGSWORTH, supra, at 2–5. For the mutual influence 
of state and federal labor statutes upon one another, see generally KILLINGSWORTH, supra. 
 308. See Brady, supra note 208. 
 309. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). 
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and cooperation based upon a desire for mutual understanding, 
reconciliation, and achievement of the common good.310 In the 
Catholic Church’s view, strikes are permissible as an “extreme”311 or 
“ultimate”312 means for defending worker rights, but they may never 
be abused for the purposes of narrow self-interest,313 and the parties 
must “resume negotiations and the discussion of reconciliation” as 
soon as possible.314 Likewise, the National Labor Relation Board’s 
interpretation of the Act to prohibit promises and grants of benefits 
made by employers during an election campaign in order to 
discourage a pro-union vote also frustrates the Church’s vision.315 
Such a prohibition impedes the genuine attempts at reconciliation 
that the Catholic Church encourages as well as the threatening and 
misleading gestures feared by the Board.316 Moreover, provisions in 
the Act designed to channel all bilateral dealings over working 
conditions into collective bargaining or other arms-length 
relationships restrict the type of collaboration between labor and 
management that the Catholic Church envisions.317 Forcing workers 
 310. See Brady, supra note 208, at 114–15, 119–122. 
 311. POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 20 (1981), reprinted in CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 352, 381 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas 
A. Shannon eds., 1992). 
 312. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON 
THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD ¶ 68 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 166, 212. 
 313. See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 311, ¶ 20, at 381; POPE PAUL VI, 
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS ¶ 14 (1971), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 311, at 265, 270. 
 314. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 68, at 212. 
 315. See Brady, supra note 208, at 122–28. The Board has held that such promises and 
grants of benefits violate section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, e.g., Hudson Hosiery Co., 72 
N.L.R.B. 1434, 1436–37 (1947); see also NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408–
09 (1964) (describing and approving the Board’s position). Section 8(a)(1) is codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2001). 
 316. According to the Board, promises and grants of benefits during an election 
campaign will interfere with employee free choice. In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., the 
Supreme Court explained that employees will interpret promises or grants of benefits as the 
equivalent of a threat of reprisal should they choose the union. See Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 
409. In addition, when employers make promises or grants of benefits, they are not to be 
trusted, and any benefits will be fleeting. See id. at 410. 
 317. See Brady, supra note 208, at 128–38 (discussing section 8(a)(2) of the Act). 
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial 
or other support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001). The Act defines a “labor organization” 
as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, 
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing 
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and employers into independent camps on opposite sides of the 
bargaining table fosters distrust and division, not the unity that the 
Church seeks.318 Thus, while the Church clearly supports collective 
bargaining and worker rights, courts upholding the application of 
secular labor statutes to Catholic institutions have not recognized 
the deep differences between the Church’s vision and the legal 
frameworks that these courts have imposed. 
The lessons from these cases go even further. If one examines 
cases in which Catholic organizations have objected to mandatory 
collective bargaining on First Amendment grounds, one will not find 
reference to the differences I have described. Church institutions 
have not argued that the Catholic vision of collective bargaining is 
incompatible with secular regimes. Indeed, in a few cases, Catholic 
institutions had been voluntarily bargaining with unions under 
secular law for years.319 The absence of the type of argument I have 
sketched may, in part, have been strategic. After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop, Catholic institutions 
understandably chose to emphasize the types of issues that the Court 
raised in that case.320 However, in many cases, Catholic employers 
were probably not aware of the differences that I have described. 
Employers may simply not have given the relationship between 
secular bargaining regimes and Catholic social teaching extended 
examination, or they may have been unfamiliar with secular labor 
statutes and, thus, unaware of potential conflicts. Indeed, in my 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.” Id. § 152(5). The Board has construed the term 
“dealing with” broadly; covered interactions go beyond actual collective bargaining and 
include any bilateral processes in which employees make proposals to management and these 
proposals are considered by management. See Brady, supra note 208, at 129. 
According to the Board, the purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to ensure that labor 
organizations that deal with management on working conditions are independent of 
management. See id. at 130–31. Section 8(a)(2) is violated whenever an employer dominates, 
interferes with, or supports such an organization, such as by creating and structuring the 
organization. The effect of section 8(a)(2) is to funnel all bilateral dealing between employers 
and employees over working conditions into collective bargaining or some other arm’s-length 
relationship. See id. at 130–32. 
 318. See Brady, supra note 208, at 131–32, 135–38. 
 319. See Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 
1163 (2d Cir. 1985); see also South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the 
Infant Jesus Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 716 (N.J. 1997) (explaining that the 
diocese had a “past history of collective bargaining with lay high-school teachers”). 
 320. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 208, at 140–41. 
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earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective 
bargaining, I discuss several cases in which Catholic employers 
unwittingly violated labor statutes when following basic principles of 
Catholic social thought in interactions with union members.321 For 
these employers, the conflicts between secular law and Catholic 
teaching only became apparent as their relationship with union 
members unfolded over time. 
Thus, courts may have difficulty determining whether 
government regulations burden group beliefs or practices because 
the religious group itself may be unaware of potential conflicts. 
Conflicts between religious doctrine and secular law may exist, but 
they may not be visible at the outset to either the church or the 
courts. In other cases, courts may be stymied by multiple 
interpretations of church doctrine. There are, for example, Catholic 
scholars who genuinely believe that collective bargaining under 
federal and state law is compatible with the Church’s vision for labor 
relations.322 They and I disagree about the proper interpretation of 
Catholic social teaching. Sometimes multiple interpretations of 
church doctrine are a sign that the group’s beliefs are changing or 
developing. In either case, there may be no single authoritative view 
but many legitimate positions, all of which represent permissible 
interpretations of existing beliefs. Where multiple interpretations of 
church doctrine exist, any choice among them will entangle the 
courts in religious questions and interfere with the free development 
of doctrine. Indeed, the fact that religious doctrine is not static but 
develops over time means that government regulation which imposes 
no burden today may do so tomorrow, and views which are 
unorthodox today or even barely articulable may be authoritative 
tomorrow. It will be difficult for courts to recognize and keep up 
with such changes particularly where new doctrines are in the early 
stages of development or adoption. 
Courts may try to address these problems by deferring to the 
religious organization regarding its beliefs and burdens on those 
beliefs. In theory, courts that exercise such deference will not 
become embroiled in religious questions and will give sufficient 
 321. See id. at 141–44. 
 322. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Religion Through Labor and 
Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 67 (1992); David L. Gregory & 
Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic 
Labor Theory, 41 LAB. L.J. 55, 63 (1990). 
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protection when beliefs or practices are infringed. However, while 
such deference may reduce the difficulties that courts face, it will not 
eliminate them. As discussed above, religious organizations may not 
be aware of the ways in which government regulation will impede 
their doctrine and practices. Simply deferring to the organization 
regarding burdens on religious exercise will not provide sufficient 
protection where the organization itself does not fully understand 
the relationship between government regulation and church practice. 
Moreover, when burdens are later experienced after the application 
of secular law, the organization may find it difficult to obtain relief 
from the courts particularly if there has been prior unsuccessful 
litigation. The reviewing court may be tempted to view later 
complaints as a mere pretext for unwillingness to incur the monetary 
costs of regulation or other intrusions unrelated to religious matters. 
Moreover, because religious doctrine is constantly changing, courts 
must be willing to recognize new conflicts where none existed 
previously. Courts may be tempted to believe that regulation that is 
permissible today will be permissible tomorrow, but this may not be 
true. To the extent that courts are slow to recognize change, they 
may impede the free development of doctrine and chill the behavior 
of members and leaders who will understandably hesitate to promote 
changes that will result in prolonged and uncertain litigation.323 
Unless courts are truly prepared to defer whenever the religious 
organization claims that government regulation interferes with 
 323. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that similar concerns 
about judicial misunderstanding may chill the activities of religious organizations. As discussed 
above, the Court in Amos addressed Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations from the 
statute’s prohibition on religious discrimination in employment. See supra text accompanying 
notes 94–102. While an earlier exemption extended only to the organization’s religious 
activities, the current exemption extends to nonreligious activities as well. See id. Those 
challenging the exemption argued that the broader provision cannot be justified as an attempt 
to alleviate government interference with religious practice because the earlier exemption had 
already provided adequate protection. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335–36. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. Id. at 336. According to the Court, “it is a significant burden on a religious 
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a 
secular court will consider religious.” Id. The Court pointed out that the line between the 
group’s religious and nonreligious activities “is hardly a bright one” and that “an organization 
might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and 
sense of mission.” Id. Were this to happen, “[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way an 
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.” Id.; see also id. at 343–
44 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the prospect of litigation and 
judicial misunderstanding “create the danger of chilling religious activity”). 
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religious belief or doctrine, there is a significant chance that judges 
will become entangled in religious doctrine and either miss, or be 
slow to recognize, substantial burdens. 
These examples from cases involving labor and employment 
regulation illustrate a basic lesson that is repeated over and over 
again in the Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute decisions and yet 
again in Smith. Courts are not fit to interpret religious doctrine and 
engage in religious questions. As the Court in Watson v. Jones 
observed, where civil courts resolve religious questions, the appeal is 
“from the more learned tribunal . . . to one which is less so.”324 
Thus, whether mandatory collective bargaining conflicts with 
Catholic doctrine is not a question that the Second Circuit or any 
other court is competent to answer. Nor are courts competent to 
measure the burden on religious doctrine when federal 
antidiscrimination laws are applied to the employment policies of 
conservative Christian schools. Judicial inquiry into the centrality of 
religious beliefs as prohibited in Smith is just one impermissible form 
of entanglement in church doctrine. The determination of whether 
government regulation places a burden on organizational belief and 
practice is another. 
Indeed, the problem is even more basic. When judges become 
entangled in doctrinal questions involving religious denominations 
different from their own, they lack the concepts and experiences 
necessary to fully understand what is at stake. Faith is not irrational 
or nonrational as some scholars have suggested, nor is it completely 
impenetrable to outsiders.325 However, faith sheds a light that allows 
the believer to see things differently and anew. Where judges do not 
share this perspective, they are likely to miss matters of religious or 
spiritual significance, and they will also have difficulty recognizing 
where their own limitations lie. 
Efforts by courts and scholars to carve out special areas of 
protection for quintessentially religious matters are no less 
problematic. As noted above, courts addressing the application of 
antidiscrimination statutes to religious organizations have developed 
a ministerial exception that protects the church-minister relationship 
 324. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872). 
 325. See Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary 
Debates in Theology Can Help To Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious 
Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 575 (1999). 
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from state interference regardless of whether the organization has a 
religious basis for its actions.326 The church-minister relationship is 
an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern”327 so “close to the heart of 
the church”328 that the state may not interfere even if there is no 
doctrinal reason for the discrimination. Interference in the church-
minister relationship, by definition, burdens religious practice. 
Scholars such as Bagni and Esbeck would expand the sphere of 
special protection to include other core religious matters. Bagni’s 
“spiritual epicenter” includes membership policies, religious 
education, worship, and ritual as well as the relationship between 
church and minister.329 For Esbeck, “inherently religious” matters 
also include ecclesiastical polity, church discipline, and personnel 
decisions where employees are chosen on the basis of religion.330 For 
Lupu and Tuttle, the protected zone consists of those aspects of 
religious organizations that are “bound up with the sacred”331 and 
uniquely distinctive from the temporal and material concerns of the 
state.332
At first glance, this approach seems to avoid the concerns raised 
in Smith. If it is possible to identify a set of activities that are 
inherently or quintessentially religious, judges can protect these areas 
from government interference without having to engage in religion-
specific analyses that would entangle the courts in religious doctrine 
and belief.333 However, there are several difficulties with this 
approach. First, the aspects of church life which are uniquely or 
quintessentially religious are not obvious. Courts may readily agree 
 326. See supra notes 111–23 and accompanying text. 
 327. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
 328. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 217–19. 
 330. See supra text accompanying notes 220–26. 
 331. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 84. 
 332. See id. at 92. 
 333. Indeed, Lupu and Tuttle have defended their approach on this ground. Citing 
Smith, Lupu and Tuttle argue that the protected aspects of religious organizations “cannot rest 
upon the subjective perceptions of the governed concerning what constitutes the inviolable 
core of their faith.” Id. at 83. The majority in Smith recognized that “issues of what lies, or 
does not lie, at the centrality of faith for particular believers is beyond judicial competence.” Id. 
Instead, Lupu and Tuttle begin with a “political concept of religion,” id., and define protected 
matters as those which relate to the “world beyond the temporal and material concerns that are 
the proper jurisdiction of the state,” id. at 92. 
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that the selection of clergy belongs within this protected zone, and 
probably worship and ritual as well, but there will surely be 
disagreement about what other matters merit special protection. For 
example, while Esbeck has identified church discipline as an 
inherently religious matter,334 the Ninth Circuit recently refused to 
extend the same protection to disciplinary matters, even decisions 
involving clergy. In Bollard v. California Province of the Society of 
Jesus,335 the Ninth Circuit addressed a sexual harassment claim by a 
Jesuit seminarian under Title VII.336 The seminarian alleged that he 
had been sexually harassed on several occasions by his superiors, and 
that when he reported the harassment, the order did nothing about 
it.337 The court allowed the claim and distinguished disciplinary 
decisions regarding clergy from the selection of clergy.338 At least 
where a church does not offer a religious reason for the harassment, 
the court found that “it stray[ed] too far from the rationale of the 
Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional protection to this sort 
of disciplinary inaction simply because a minister is the target as well 
as the agent of the harassing activity.”339 Other courts disagree. For 
example, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,340 the 
Maine Supreme Court held that “[p]astoral supervision is an 
ecclesiastical prerogative.”341 The litigation in Swanson involved a 
claim against a Catholic diocese for negligent supervision of a priest 
who had engaged in sexual misconduct during marital counseling.342 
The court held that the claim violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because the imposition of secular tort standards on the church’s 
relationship with its ministers interferes with “denominational 
governance.”343 Thus, in many cases it will not be easy to get 
agreement among courts about which aspects of church life should 
be specially protected, and when there is controversy and 
 334. See Esbeck, supra note 221, at 308; Esbeck, supra note 220, at 44–45; Esbeck, 
supra note 106, at 397, 420. 
 335. 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 336. See id. at 944. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See id. at 946–47. 
 339. Id. at 947; see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955–58 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (following Bollard, 196 F.3d 940). 
 340. 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997). 
 341. Id. at 445. 
 342. Id. at 442. 
 343. Id. at 445. 
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uncertainty, courts will almost certainly get drawn into an 
examination of religious beliefs and practice. 
Another difficulty is that the aspects of church administration 
that are quintessentially religious differ from group to group. There 
is, in fact, no single category of church functions that is of prime 
importance in all traditions. Different religious traditions lodge their 
core religious functions in different places, and sensitivity to the 
diversity of America’s religious traditions would involve courts in the 
type of religion-specific inquiry prohibited in Smith.344 This problem 
is illustrated well by federal court decisions applying the ministerial 
exception in employment discrimination cases. Courts employing 
this exception envision the role of the minister in the church as of 
supreme religious importance. The minister is the “lifeblood”345 of 
the church and at the “heart of church administration.”346 While this 
special status may seem obvious to many in mainline denominations, 
it does not fit well with churches that either have no ministers at all 
or where the category of minister goes well beyond a select group of 
church leaders. For example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary,347 the seminary viewed its faculty and 
administrative staff as ministers.348 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the 
seminary’s faculty should be considered ministers349 but refused to 
extend the ministerial exception to include the staff.350 According to 
the court, the seminary’s administrative staff does not perform 
traditional ecclesiastical functions.351 While the seminary’s 
designation of its staff as ministers reflected its belief that they played 
a critical role in the school’s religious mission, the court did not 
attach the same importance to their jobs. The court was working 
with a much narrower conception of minister than the seminary. 
 344. See supra notes 262–63, 286 and accompanying text. 
 345. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Gellington 
v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); 
Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (same); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist 
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). 
 346. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 347. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 348. Id. at 284–85. 
 349. Id. at 283–84. 
 350. Id. at 285. 
 351. Id. at 284–85. 
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Likewise, when teachers in the Christian school operated by the 
Shenandoah Baptist Church identified themselves as ministers, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected their characterization and distinguished them 
from “pastoral staff,” employees with “sacerdotal functions,” and 
“church governors.”352 While the teachers in this case taught from a 
pervasively religious perspective,353 viewed their jobs as a “personal 
ministry,”354 and were employed at an institution that played a 
critical role in the church’s evangelizing mission,355 the Fourth 
Circuit had a much different picture of the clergy role. Schools like 
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and the elementary and 
secondary school operated by Shenandoah Baptist Church reflect a 
common belief about ministry in evangelical Protestant 
communities. For evangelical Protestants, all church members who 
use their gifts to serve the religious mission of the church play a 
ministerial role. The roots of this doctrine go back to the 
Reformation’s insistence upon “the priesthood of all believers.” 
Within this evangelical perspective, protecting only ordained clergy 
or employees whose role is similar to those who have been ordained 
misunderstands basic church polity. All members who serve the 
church are its lifeblood; all play an essential role in its religious 
mission. 
To be sure, federal courts have been careful to expand the 
category of minister beyond ordained clergy to others who perform 
ministerial functions. Many courts have adopted the definition 
suggested by Bruce Bagni and include any employee whose “primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in 
religious ritual and worship.”356 This inquiry is designed to 
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and 
pastoral mission of the church.”357 However, Bagni’s definition is 
still relatively narrow and reflects a familiar, but by no means 
 352. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 1391–92. 
 356. Bagni, supra note 106, at 1545, quoted in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 
461 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 357. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; see also Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801 (quoting Rayburn); 
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461 (same). 
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universal, view of ministers as employees with leadership or worship 
roles, or direct responsibilities for the spread of the church’s 
message. The administrative staff at Southwestern Baptist 
Theological Seminary would not be included even if their work is 
essential to the success of the institution’s religious mission. Nor 
would other employees who serve religious organizations in 
nonsupervisory and nonteaching roles. 
Such a narrow understanding of essential ecclesiastical functions 
is also incompatible with Roman Catholic polity. While the Catholic 
Church is one of the most hierarchical of all Christian 
denominations, the Catholic Church does not limit essential 
religious functions to ordained clergy or those with similar 
leadership, teaching, or worship roles. For example, in the Catholic 
Church’s social mission, those who feed and counsel the needy also 
proclaim the Church’s message just as much as do preachers from 
the pulpit.358 For many scholars, the social services activities of 
religious organizations are viewed as less purely or quintessentially 
religious than teaching and worship. For example, Bagni places social 
services operations outside the spiritual epicenter and closer to the 
secular world than core religious functions.359 Esbeck has also 
described social services activities as a “second tier of religious 
ministry” that is “more the outgrowth of truths held by religious 
faiths than they are centrally dealing with the particulars of one’s 
perception of ultimate truth.”360 For the Catholic Church, this is a 
misunderstanding of the Christian message. When Christ reveals 
God’s love for humanity on the cross, he invites others to share in 
 358. POPE PAUL VI, EVANGELII NUNTIANDI §§ 15, 21 (1975), reprinted in CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 303, 307–08, 310–11; ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, 
supra note 306, §§ 45–47, at 25–26. 
 359. See Bagni, supra note 106, at 1539–40. 
 360. Esbeck, supra note 106, at 377. In its recent decision in Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court went 
much further and found that the relationship between a Catholic social services agency and its 
employees, many of whom were non-Catholics, was not a matter of internal church governance 
protected under the U.S. Supreme Court’s intrachurch dispute precedents. Id. at 77. The 
court distinguished Catholic Charities of Sacramento from a church and described it as a 
“nonprofit public benefit corporation.” Id. While lower courts in the labor and employment 
area have routinely described the operations of religiously affiliated social services agencies as 
essentially secular, they have not suggested that these organizations fall outside the ambit of 
the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases. 
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his life by imitating this love.361 Serving the poor and needy is not a 
second tier expression of one’s faith. It is part and parcel of the 
Gospel message. Indeed, it is the Christian message in deed as well as 
word. When church members serve their neighbors in need, they 
follow, model, and witness the love of God. Thus, within the work 
of the counselor, the administrator, and even the cook there is the 
essence of the Catholic Church’s teaching.362
Even if the ministerial exception is appropriately limited to 
leadership, worship, and teaching roles, the courts have had difficulty 
in expanding their vision beyond familiar clergy jobs to include all 
employees with primary responsibilities for teaching the church’s 
message. If one examines the outcomes of federal circuit court 
opinions involving the ministerial exception, one will find that the 
courts have not strayed far from traditional clerical positions. 
Employees identified as ministerial have included ordained clergy,363 
seminary faculty,364 a pastoral associate,365 a diocesan 
 361. See Kathleen A. Brady, Catholic Social Thought and the Public Square: Deconstructing 
the Demand for Public Accessibility, 1 VILL. J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 203, 208–09 
(2004). 
 362. According to the California Supreme Court in Catholic Charities, Catholic Charities 
acknowledged in its complaint that “[t]he corporate purpose of [the organization] is not the 
direct inculcation of religious values.” Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 75. See supra note 360 
for a discussion of this case. This statement is misleading, and it contributed to the court’s 
misunderstanding. While Catholic social services agencies may not teach religious values 
explicitly, they do so by example. Indeed, Catholic Charities recognized its central 
responsibility for fostering the Church’s values when it described its purpose as to “promote a 
just, compassionate society” that supports human dignity. Catholic Charities, 85 P.2d at 75. 
Moreover, the fact that Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to join its work and 
receive its services does not undermine this religious purpose or its expression of the Catholic 
faith. According to the California court, the relationship between Catholic Charities and its 
employees, most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church, is not an internal church 
matter. Id. at 76–78. The court misunderstands. While Catholic Charities has invited non-
Catholics to share in its religious mission, it retains the authority to decide what this mission is 
and to ensure that all relationships within the organization appropriately reflect its religious 
values. 
 363. See Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 
F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United 
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of 
United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 
F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (probationary minister). 
 364. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
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communications manager,366 a professor of canon law at a Catholic 
university,367 and music directors and teachers.368 Excluded from the 
ministerial exception have been faculty at a pervasively religious 
Christian college369 and lay teachers in church-operated elementary 
and secondary schools.370 Indeed, except for theology and music 
teachers,371 no federal court has included lay teachers at religiously 
affiliated schools within the ministerial exception.372 In its landmark 
Establishment Clause decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman,373 the Supreme 
Court found that lay teachers in parochial schools play a critical role 
in disseminating religious beliefs and doctrine and that religion is 
intertwined with secular instruction.374 The Court in Catholic Bishop 
repeated these observations.375 Nevertheless, lower courts applying 
the ministerial exception have largely bypassed these precedents as 
they have concluded that the educational responsibilities of lay 
teachers are not sufficiently religious to qualify them as ministers. 
 365. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th 
Cir. 1985). 
 366. See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 367. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 368. See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(music director and music teacher at a church-operated school); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 
173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choirmaster and director of music). 
 369. See EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 370. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 
1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Dole v. Shenandoah 
Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 
1362 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 371. In Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994), a federal district court held 
that a theology teacher at a Catholic school is covered by the ministerial exception. Cf. Curay-
Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, No. CIV.A.03-1014-KAJ, 2004 WL 2632958 (D. Del. 
Nov. 16, 2004) (suggesting but not deciding that a religion teacher at a parochial school falls 
within the ministerial exception). In Raleigh, the Fourth Circuit found that a music teacher at a 
Catholic school functioned as a minister. Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 804–05. State courts have also 
identified school principals as ministerial employees. See, e.g., Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish, 
672 A.2d 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of the 
Archdiocese of Wash., No. 02-5459, 2003 WL 21753776 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003). 
 372. But see Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994). In Gabriel, a lower state court addressed a claim for breach of contract brought by a 
kindergarten teacher against a church-operated school, and the court held that the teacher was a 
ministerial employee whose employment was an ecclesiastical issue into which civil courts could not 
intervene. I have found no other case, state or federal, which has held that lay teachers in church-
operated schools fall within the ministerial exception or otherwise qualify as ministerial employees. 
 373. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 374. See id. at 616–19. 
 375. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501–03 (1979). 
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The difficulty with any judicial or scholarly line drawing between 
core religious matters and less sensitive functions goes even further. 
For some denominations, there is simply no line that can be drawn 
between religious and nonreligious functions. Everything that goes 
on within the organization is suffused with religious significance. 
Where the outsider sees routine or secular matters, the church 
members see important religious activity. Again, the Catholic 
Church provides a good example. In state and lower federal court 
cases upholding the application of labor statutes to religiously 
affiliated social services programs and schools, the courts have been 
confident that collective bargaining requirements will not interfere 
with religious practice. According to these courts, because religiously 
affiliated social services organizations function just like nonreligious 
charitable enterprises and are essentially secular in their operations, 
any intrusion on religious matters will be minimal.376 In the context 
of church-operated schools, the courts have held that interference 
with religious matters can be avoided if bargaining is limited to 
wages, hours, and other secular terms of employment.377  
However, where Catholic organizations are involved, such a 
division between secular and religious activities is not possible. For 
the Catholic Church, the entire inner life of the religious community 
must model and witness the Gospel principles of charity, 
cooperation, and mutual concern.378 The Catholic Church and its 
institutions are to be an example and an instrument of a new kind of 
social life built upon the love of Christ and unifying all persons with 
God and one another.379 Thus, while the operations of Catholic 
social services organizations may appear to be essentially secular, they 
are, in fact, suffused with religious significance. Not only are the 
activities of service programs a response to and imitation of God’s 
love demonstrated on the cross, but the very internal life and social 
relations within the community are a sign and witness of this love. 
Catholic communities proclaim the Gospel message through their 
work and their communal life. Justice Brennan recognized the 
quintessentially religious character of such social services programs in 
 376. See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 173, 178, and accompanying text. 
 378. See Brady, Catholic Social Thought, supra note 361, at 219–20; Brady, supra note 
208, at 112–13. 
 379. See Brady, Catholic Social Thought, supra note 361, at 219–20; Brady, supra note 
208, at 112–13. 
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his concurrence in Amos. According to Justice Brennan, “[c]hurches 
often regard the provision of such services as a means of fulfilling 
religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a 
church seeks to foster.”380 For the Catholic Church, social services 
activities are no more secular than worship and preaching. 
Nor will limiting collective bargaining to wages, hours, and other 
secular terms of employment solve the problem. In labor-
management relations, like all social relations, the Catholic Church 
seeks collaboration and cooperation and rejects adversarialism.381 
Requiring the Church to bargain under secular bargaining regimes 
that presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship between 
labor and management will undermine the Church’s ability to live 
out its religious beliefs. Even if bargaining is limited to secular terms 
of employment, the process of bargaining under secular regimes 
remains incompatible with the church’s doctrine and practice. Where 
all the relationships within a religious organization are suffused with 
religious significance as in the Catholic context, disentangling the 
secular from the religious is simply not possible. 
Thus, the only effective and workable protection for the ability of 
religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free 
from government interference is a broad right of church autonomy 
that extends to all aspects of church affairs. While in theory it may be 
preferable to grant relief only in situations where religious doctrine 
or practice is actually burdened, Smith prohibits the type of judicial 
inquiry that such an approach would require, and existing case law 
demonstrates that judges are not able to identify such burdens 
accurately. Line drawing between quintessentially religious activities 
and activities that are less critical to the religious mission is similarly 
problematic. It is by no means clear where such a line should be 
drawn, and, moreover, there is no single line that fits all religious 
organizations. For some organizations, like the Catholic Church, no 
such line exists at all. Thus, the only approach to government 
regulation of religious groups that is fully consistent with the lessons 
in Smith is a right of autonomy that extends to all matters of church 
administration, not just those with core religious significance and not 
just those that are demonstrably burdened by the state. 
 380. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 381. See supra notes 308–18 and accompanying text. 
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C. Religious Belief and Democratic Government 
At this point, the reader might object to the direction of my 
argument. If limiting relief to identifiable burdens on religious belief 
and practice is not possible and no line can be drawn between 
quintessentially religious matters and less significant practices, the 
lesson of Smith is to abandon special protections for religious groups 
altogether. The Smith Court reached that conclusion in the context 
of individual religious exercise when it found that judges were unfit 
to determine when government action burdens practices central to 
individual believers.382 Why should the outcome be different with 
respect to religious groups? I have argued above that full freedom of 
religious belief requires at least some special protections for groups, 
but perhaps that was the wrong starting point. After all, Smith does 
not guarantee a diversity of religious perspectives or that religious 
belief will be unaffected by government action. Smith states that 
government may not regulate beliefs as such, but the decision 
requires nothing further. The Smith Court may envision a world of 
diverse religious beliefs unimpeded by government action, but it did 
nothing to ensure such an environment. Moreover, while it might be 
desirable, in the abstract, to provide strong protections for religious 
belief and the groups that shape and sustain belief, there are 
countervailing state policies at stake when neutral laws of general 
applicability are involved. At this point, the reader should recall Ira 
Lupu’s observation that the internal affairs of religious groups can 
have substantial effects upon the larger society, sometimes quite 
negative, and, thus, the state has important interests in extending 
neutral regulation to religious groups.383 While the internal affairs of 
religious groups may not affect the external affairs of the larger 
community directly, they often do so indirectly. When religious 
organizations shape attitudes, moral convictions, and behavior in the 
larger society, as they frequently do, what goes on within the 
organizations has important consequences for those outside the 
group.384 A broad right of church autonomy provides little 
protection when these consequences are harmful, and the religious 
organization prevails even in situations where there is no burden on 
religious belief and practice. Why should protections for religious 
 382. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 383. See Lupu, supra note 64, at 408–09. 
 384. See id. 
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belief necessarily trump countervailing state policies except in narrow 
cases where the group’s behavior directly harms outsiders? Perhaps 
the readiness of lower courts to find compelling state interests when 
employment and labor laws burden group belief and practice reflects 
an important reality that supporters of a broad right of church 
autonomy ignore. Church autonomy comes at a cost, and given this 
cost, why is such a right desirable? 
On this question as well, Smith provides important guidance. In 
the framework that Smith establishes for individual religious exercise, 
democratic processes play the central role in protecting religious 
liberty. The Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee relief where 
individual practice is burdened by neutral state action, but citizens 
can and, when reasonable, should extend such protection through 
legislative accommodations. 
The faith that Smith places in democratic government invites 
consideration of the conditions that are necessary for its flourishing. 
If strong protections for individual religious belief and the groups 
that nurture and sustain belief are critical for successful democratic 
government, a broad right of church autonomy should certainly be 
preferred over the alternative of no special protections at all. Many 
scholars in recent years have emphasized the importance of religious 
groups and other voluntary associations for sustaining a well-
functioning democratic order. Religious groups are among the 
“mediating structures” or institutions of “civil society” that stand 
between the individual and the state and transmit the values, skills, 
and attitudes necessary for self-government.385 As the source of 
moral values, they function as “seedbeds of civic virtue.”386 As 
training grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and 
 385. Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus popularized the term “mediating 
structures.” PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM 
STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 158 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996). The term “civil society” is 
also very common in recent literature. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, 
Foreword: Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls To Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 289, 289 (2000). 
 386. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 109 (1991); Linda C. McLain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for 
Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2000); Yael Tamir, Revisiting 
the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 218 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); see also 
SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995). 
1BRD-FIN 12/16/2004 12:33 PM 
1633] Religious Organizations and Free Exercise 
 1701 
 
responsibilities, they are “schools for democracy.”387 However, for 
many scholars who have emphasized the importance of associational 
life in the democratic order, this critical role does not call for strong 
protections against state interference. To the contrary, the state has 
an important role in shaping the internal affairs of religious and other 
civic groups so that they are congruent with democratic norms and 
shared public values.388 These scholars fear minority groups who 
teach “illiberal” values that will destabilize rather than strengthen 
democratic government.389 Too much diversity in associational life is 
not a good thing when this diversity undermines our common civic 
culture.390
For those who desire congruence between the internal affairs of 
civil society institutions and shared public values, full freedom of 
religious belief is not desirable nor are strong protections for 
religious group autonomy. These scholars do not want to “bend 
over backwards” to protect minority religious groups from state 
interference where these groups do not support common civic 
 387. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 385, at 194; see also McClain & Fleming, supra 
note 386, at 309–11; Tamir, supra note 386, at 218. 
 388. As Amy Gutmann has written: 
A government that is constitutionally dedicated to liberal democratic principles has a 
strong interest in supporting a vast assortment of associational activities among its 
citizens. But it also has a strong interest in regulating associations so that they 
support a liberal democratic form of government and public policies that are 
consistent with liberal democratic principles. 
Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, 
supra note 386, at 18; see also STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC 
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 108, 151, 134–35, 277 (2000) [hereinafter 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST]; Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations 
and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & L. SOC’Y 393, 394–95 (1992); Stephen Macedo, 
Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal 
Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 428, 432, 440–41, 451 (2000); Stephen Macedo, 
The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573–74, 1592–93 (2001). For discussions of scholarship 
advocating this position, see NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE 
PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 36–41 (1998), and Tamir, supra note 386, at 
220–22. Both Rosenblum and Tamir disagree with those who favor using the power of the 
state to achieve congruence between the internal values of groups and public values. See 
ROSENBLUM, supra, at 47–65, 349–50; Tamir, supra note 386, at 215, 222–26. For others 
criticizing the demand for congruence, see William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and 
Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603, 604–05 (2000). 
 389. See MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 388, at 197; see also Tamir, 
supra note 386, at 222 (discussing such fear). 
 390. See MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 388, at 2, 34, 134–35, 146–
47, 219. 
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values.391 Like Lupu in his earlier work,392 they emphasize the ways in 
which the internal affairs of religious groups can have harmful effects 
on the larger society, and rather than broad autonomy, they 
welcome regulation that shapes, molds, and constitutes religious and 
other groups according to shared public values. A number of legal 
scholars who have written about religious group rights in the context 
of labor and employment laws share this position. Pointing to the 
role that religious groups play in shaping culture and transmitting 
values,393 these scholars have argued that employment discrimination 
within religious organizations threatens a “culture of subordination” 
that harms outsiders as well as members.394 Discrimination by 
religious institutions “send[s] a powerful social message”395 and 
“imbeds . . . prejudice in American culture.”396 Labor conflicts, 
particularly in educational institutions, also impart the wrong 
values.397 The state’s interest in enforcing labor and employment 
regulation is, therefore, very strong.398 The Fifth Circuit in EEOC v. 
Mississippi College.399 summarized this view well when it held that the 
state’s interest in eradicating discrimination justified application of 
Title VII to faculty positions at a pervasively religious Christian 
college.400 According to the court, 
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute 
in comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII, 
their effect upon society at large is great because of the role they 
play in educating society’s young. If the environment in which such 
institutions seek to achieve their religious and educational goals 
reflects unlawful discrimination, those discriminatory attitudes will 
 391. Id. at 147, 197. 
 392. See supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text. 
 393. See Brant, supra note 64, at 277–78; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary 
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1091–93, 1114 (1996). 
 394. Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1114, 1123. 
 395. Brant, supra note 64, at 277. 
 396. Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1091. 
 397. See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Application of Labor Relations and Discrimination 
Statutes to Lay Teachers at Religious Schools: The Establishment Clause and the Pretext Inquiry, 
64 ALB. L. REV. 629, 671, 674 (2000). 
 398. See Brant, supra note 64, at 278; Rutherford, supra note 393, at 1116, 1121–23; 
Tenenbaum, supra note 397, at 671, 673–74. 
 399. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 400. Id. at 488–89. 
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be perpetuated with an influential segment of society, the 
detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated.401
All of these scholars misunderstand the proper relationship 
between religious groups and democratic government. Democratic 
government is not supported best by homogeneity of beliefs and 
values, even beliefs whose correctness seems unassailable and values 
that seem essential for democratic life. Shaping associational life so 
that the internal practices and values of religious groups and other 
mediating institutions match shared public norms stifles new ideas 
that could challenge prevailing perspectives in progressive directions. 
Where government regulation inhibits the preservation, transmission, 
and development of minority beliefs within religious communities 
and other civic groups, it disserves democracy, not serves it. Full 
freedom of belief, even unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential 
to the health of democratic society as are the groups that make such 
beliefs possible. If democratic majorities were permitted to entrench 
prevailing values by intruding upon the internal practices of 
institutions that promote alternative views, improvements in the 
status quo would be difficult to make and errors would go 
unchallenged. Without unorthodox ideas, society will stagnate. The 
dangers are especially grave when democratic majorities are given 
primary responsibility for protecting individual liberties as they are in 
Smith.402 While it may be preferable in theory to protect only positive 
alternatives and new ideas that are helpful rather than harmful, 
humility requires us to admit that we do not always know where 
today’s errors lie or where tomorrow’s advances are hidden. 
A number of other scholars have also defended the importance of 
religious group freedom in a democratic society. Religious groups 
and other civic associations are buffers against overweening state 
power.403 Religious groups enhance individual autonomy by 
providing the context for personal development and expression.404 
Religious groups can also provide a realm of privacy, intimacy, and 
 401. Id. at 489. 
 402. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text. 
 403. See Esbeck, supra note 220, at 53, 67–68; Garnett, supra note 270, at 1853; 
Gedicks, supra note 106, at 115, 158; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 40, 84. 
 404. See Gedicks, supra note 106, at 115–16, 158; see also Tamir, supra note 386, at 215. 
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supportive social bonds.405 In addition, religious groups mark the 
limits of state jurisdiction by addressing spiritual matters that lie 
beyond the temporal concerns of government.406
My view goes further. Religious groups do not just check the 
power of the state, provide a context for individual development and 
communal support, or address extratemporal matters. Nor do they 
simply transmit important values and skills essential for democratic 
self-government, though they certainly do play all of these roles. 
Rather, for many religious groups, spiritual matters have much to say 
about the shape of the temporal order. Religious communities with 
prophetic traditions speak to the state and its citizens about the 
content of laws, the distribution of wealth and power, and the 
requirements of justice. Gerard Bradley has written that “[i]t is 
precisely the lot of a church to live by norms unsuited to organize a 
polity acting in history.”407 This is only partly true. Of course, no 
political system can mirror the relationships and structures 
appropriate within a church. However, for many religious traditions, 
including the Catholic tradition discussed above, the norms of the 
church are viewed as a guide for the norms of politics. The Catholic 
Church, as I observed, views its own internal life as a model for social 
relationships in the larger community, including relationships 
between labor and management. For the Catholic Church, the 
cooperative vision of collective bargaining that it advocates is not 
intended solely for its own institutions. To the contrary, it promotes 
this vision as the standard that should guide political decision makers 
and commercial actors as well. Indeed, the Church’s contemporary 
teaching on social issues began with a document designed to address 
the desperate condition of the working classes and the clash between 
capital and labor at the height of the industrial revolution.408 The 
Church believes that only the Gospel message can provide the 
 405. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1311–13; Galston, supra note 388, at 604; 
Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 
1072–75 (1983); Tamir, supra note 386, at 215. 
 406. See Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of 
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1084–87 (1989); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 
40, 84, 92; Smith, supra note 216, at 1017–18. 
 407. Bradley, supra note 406, at 1087. 
 408. This document, Rerum Novarum, was issued in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII and 
inaugurated the contemporary Catholic social thought tradition. See POPE LEO XIII, RERUM 
NOVARUM ¶¶ 1–3 (1891), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 14–
15. 
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“genuine solution” to these and other social problems.409 Indeed, 
“the new command of love” displayed on the cross, modeled in the 
communal life of the church, and imitated in the Church’s works of 
mercy is not only “the basic law of human perfection” but also “of 
the world’s transformation.”410 The Church looks forward to a 
renewed social order that reflects411 and foreshadows412 the kingdom 
of God. 
Indeed, it is activist religious traditions such as these that have 
contributed much to the development of America’s political culture 
over the course of its history. Judge John Noonan has observed that 
religious “crusades” played an indispensable role in ending slavery 
and in the fight for civil rights a century later.413 Nothing guarantees 
that religious crusades will be for the good, writes Judge Noonan.414 
Nor have any succeeded without conflict.415 However, much would 
have been lost without their contributions to the formation of 
American civic culture and political values. Though the ideals of 
religious crusades were at one time unpopular and unorthodox, and 
even abhorrent to many,416 many were, in fact, seeds of progress. 
Thus, democratic government flourishes best when religious 
communities are free to develop, teach, and practice their religious 
beliefs and doctrines without government interference, no matter 
how unpopular or even repugnant their ideas may seem. The 
alternative perspectives and ways of life that religious groups 
communicate and model are the source of new ideas that make 
change and progress possible. Diversity of religious belief and 
associational life are good things in a democracy, and they would not 
be possible without strong protections for religious groups. Lupu 
 409. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 5 (1991), reprinted in CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 439, 443. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 
361, at 215–21. 
 410. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 38, at 188. 
 411. See JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS ¶ 48 (1987), reprinted in 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 311, at 395, 430. 
 412. See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 312, ¶ 39, at 189; LABOREM EXERCENS, supra 
note 311, ¶ 27, at 389; OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 313, ¶ 37, at 278. 
 413. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 250–52, 256–58 (1998). 
 414. See id. at 250. 
 415. See id. at 258–60. 
 416. See id. at 251 (discussing the “antislavery crusade” that “angered and alienated and 
frightened the slaveholding South into rebellion”); id. at 257–58 (describing resentment 
generated by the civil rights movement). 
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and others are correct to point out that religious groups play an 
important role in shaping the larger public culture and values. It is 
for this reason that these groups must be protected from state 
interference rather than molded according to majoritarian values. 
Anything else would be shortsighted and harmful not only to the 
religious community but also to the larger society. 
At this point the reader might raise a further concern. I may have 
demonstrated that strong protections for religious belief and the 
groups that nourish these beliefs are important for democratic self-
government, but my argument applies equally well to nonreligious 
associations. Just like religious groups, nonreligious organizations 
may advocate and model new perspectives for social and political life. 
Why, then, the reader may ask, should religious groups receive 
greater protection from government interference than nonreligious 
groups enjoy? Indeed, as I observed above, many scholars in recent 
years have questioned the fairness of special protections for religious 
organizations. If religious and nonreligious groups both provide 
important benefits to individuals and society, why should religious 
groups receive more favorable treatment?417
The proper response to this concern is not to diminish 
protections for religious organizations but to expand them for 
secular associations that play similar roles in the lives of individuals 
and the larger community. Currently, the right of association under 
the Speech Clause provides considerable protections for groups that 
engage in expressive activities, including the transmission of values.418 
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that where a law 
interferes with the internal structures or affairs of expressive 
associations and, as a result, significantly impairs the ability of the 
group to advocate its chosen message, the First Amendment requires 
relief unless application of the law is justified by a compelling state 
interest.419 According to the Court, government interference need 
not be intentional to violate the Constitution.420 In either case, 
 417. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1283; Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation, 
supra note 7, at 574; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 7, at 926–27; Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39–40, 67–68 (describing this position). 
 418. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–50 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984). The Supreme Court precedent also provides strong 
protections for “intimate” associations that provide supportive contexts for personal 
development and social bonds. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617–20. 
 419. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622–23. 
 420. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). 
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protections are necessary to “preserv[e] political and cultural 
diversity”421 and to prevent the majority from “imposing its views on 
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.”422 
While most of the Court’s decisions have dealt with laws affecting 
membership and leadership choices,423 impermissible intrusions on 
internal affairs may take other forms as well. Regulation of leadership 
or membership decisions is just an “example,” though a “clear[]” 
example, of unconstitutional interference.424
The protection that nonreligious groups currently receive under 
the right of association is considerable, but it is not as expansive as 
the broad right of autonomy that I have defended for religious 
organizations. Indeed, the Court’s approach to the right of 
association strongly resembles the more moderate option for 
religious group rights that I have rejected above as unworkable. Just 
as religious groups under this option receive relief from government 
regulation only when the regulation burdens religious belief or 
practice, expressive associations are currently entitled to exemptions 
from government regulation only when it significantly affects or 
alters the group’s message. 
In my view, a broad right of autonomy should be extended to 
nonreligious associations where possible. Just as religious groups play 
an important role in democratic government, so do nonreligious 
associations with expressive purposes. Moreover, some of the same 
problems that make limiting relief to actual burdens unworkable in 
the religious context also arise where the group’s beliefs are 
nonreligious. Under the Court’s current approach to freedom of 
association, judges must determine when government action 
significantly impairs or alters the group’s message. Unfamiliarity with 
the message and the temptation to reach desirable results can lead to 
misunderstanding and error in a secular context just as in a religious 
one. 
 421. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622. 
 422. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–48. 
 423. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 640; N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 
(1988); Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 
609. 
 424. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (“Government actions that 
may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is ‘intrusion 
into the internal structure or affairs of an association’ like a ‘regulation that forces the group to 
accept members it does not desire.’” (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623)). 
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The Court’s recent decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.425 
illustrates these dangers well. In Dale, the Boy Scouts sought 
exemption from a New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in places of public association.426 The 
litigation in Dale arose when the Boy Scouts revoked the adult 
membership of James Dale, an openly homosexual assistant 
scoutmaster.427 The Boy Scouts argued that Dale’s readmittance 
would interfere with its expression because homosexual conduct is 
not consistent with the values it seeks to teach young people.428 The 
majority gave deference to the Boy Scouts’ description of its message 
and its views about what would impair this message429 and concluded 
that application of the law would violate the group’s associational 
rights.430 Four justices, led by Justice Stevens, dissented and strongly 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion and its deference to the Boy 
Scouts’ claims.431 According to the dissent, the majority should have 
engaged in an “independent analysis” of the group’s message and 
the burden imposed by the New Jersey law,432 and it should have 
required the Boy Scouts to demonstrate a “clear, unequivocal” 
position regarding homosexuality.433 Delving into the Boy Scouts’ 
internal and public statements regarding homosexuality in great 
detail, the dissent found no clear, shared stance regarding 
homosexuality.434 To the contrary, the dissent found it 
“exceptionally clear” that the Boy Scouts did not have a shared 
message disapproving of homosexuality.435
The dissenting opinion in Dale is a masterful deconstruction of 
the Boy Scouts’ argument. Turning the Boy Scouts’ statements 
against one another, the dissent goes far in undermining the Boy 
Scouts’ description of its own beliefs and in convincing the reader 
that the Boy Scouts does not really endorse the position that the 
 425. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 426. Id. at 643–46. 
 427. Id. at 644. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. at 653. 
 430. Id. at 659. 
 431. Id. at 685–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 432. Id. at 686. 
 433. Id. at 687–88. 
 434. Id. at 684–85. 
 435. Id. at 684. 
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group has adopted consistently since 1978 and advocated publicly in 
litigation and other settings.436 The dissent’s opinion is as troubling 
as it is brilliant. Giving no deference to the association’s assertions 
regarding its own beliefs and expression, the dissenting justices 
essentially turn the Boy Scouts’ position on its head, and one is left 
wondering whether the justices’ true motivation was reaching a 
desirable result. The majority stops short of making such an 
accusation, but the suggestion lies just beneath the surface. 
Criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court for reaching the same 
conclusion as the dissent, the Court stated that “it is not the role of 
the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree 
with those values or find them internally inconsistent.”437 We must 
not, the majority later cautions, be  
guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with 
respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or 
judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does 
not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept 
members where such acceptance would derogate from the 
organization’s expressive message.438  
Regardless of whether the dissent did succumb to that temptation, 
the danger was clearly present, and the dissent’s claim that its 
conclusions were “exceptionally clear” was certainly wrong. The 
disagreement between the majority and dissent in this case 
demonstrates that it is not always easy for judges to interpret the 
messages of expressive associations or ascertain when government 
action burdens those messages. This is especially so where the 
group’s beliefs are uncommon or unpopular, not fully logical or 
coherent, in the process of development, or otherwise lacking the 
clarity and consistency that the dissent would like to see. The 
deference that the majority supports would be helpful, but 
opportunities for misunderstanding will remain, as will temptations 
to misconstrue. When mistakes are made, the costs are high for both 
the group and the larger society. When government suppresses or 
alters the messages of its expressive associations, the diversity of 
voices in the community is diminished. 
 436. For a short chronology of the Boy Scouts’ internal and public statements regarding 
homosexuality, see id. at 651–53 (majority opinion). 
 437. Id. at 651. 
 438. Id. at 661. 
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How far protections for group autonomy should extend under 
the right of association is a more difficult issue. Special problems 
arise in the context of nonreligious associations that are not present 
in the case of religious organizations. Except in the rare case where a 
religious organization operates a commercial enterprise,439 most, if 
not all, of the activities of religious groups are bound up with First 
Amendment purposes. By contrast, the range of nonreligious 
associations that engage in some sort of expressive activity is 
extensive and includes many groups with significant commercial 
activities or other nonexpressive functions. Chapters of the United 
States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, which were the subject of two 
important Supreme Court decisions under the right of association in 
the 1980s, are examples.440 Thus, if all secular associations engaging 
in expressive activities were exempted from government regulation 
whenever it affects internal group affairs, much of the economic life 
of the community would be beyond state control, including the 
nonexpressive activities of organizations with significant commercial 
purposes. For this reason, a broad right of autonomy for all 
nonreligious organizations that engage in expressive association may 
not be feasible. 
How an expanded right of expressive association might be 
structured and which organizations should be covered is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Justice O’Connor has suggested drawing a 
distinction between organizations that are primarily engaged in 
expressive activities and those in which commercial or other 
nonexpressive purposes predominate, and she would accord the 
former broad protections unavailable to the latter.441 One might 
follow Justice O’Connor’s lead and extend a broad right of 
autonomy to those associations in which expressive purposes 
predominate. Other organizations would still have to show a burden 
on their expression to receive relief. Such an approach seems 
promising, and it would target strong protections to the type of 
group most likely to supply new perspectives to public discussion and 
 439. Such operations are beyond the scope of this Article. Greater regulation would be 
permissible where religious groups operate commercial enterprises. 
 440. See Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 539–41, 548–49 
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612–14 (1984); id. at 638–40 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 441. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
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debate. However, whether this approach is, in fact, fair and workable 
would require further analysis. My purpose here is simply to point us 
in the right direction. Our goal should, indeed, be greater equality 
for religious and nonreligious associations, but this goal should be 
achieved by expanding protections for nonreligious groups rather 
than diminishing protections for religious groups. 
To the extent that some differences remain between the 
treatment of religious and nonreligious groups, these differences 
need not be troubling. I have argued that the similar roles that 
religious and nonreligious groups play in democratic society justify 
strong protections for both, but these protections need not be 
exactly the same. The right of association under the Speech Clause is 
a different constitutional guarantee than the Free Exercise Clause, 
and the structure and details of the freedoms afforded under these 
two clauses will reflect that fact. 
Moreover, the Court has never required identical treatment for 
religion and nonreligion. For many contemporary scholars, religious 
belief and activity are no longer distinguishable from strongly-held 
nonreligious convictions.442 However, our constitutional regime 
reflects a contrary view. As many scholars have pointed out, the very 
existence of constitutional provisions dedicated exclusively to 
religion demonstrate that religion is distinctive in our constitutional 
framework.443 The Supreme Court’s decisions also support this 
distinctiveness. For example, in Smith, the Court permitted and, 
indeed, encouraged special legislative accommodations where 
 442. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1262–66; Gedicks, Defensible Free Exercise 
Doctrine, supra note 7, at 926–27; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39, 67–68 
(describing this development). 
 443. See Kent Greenawalt, Freedom of Association and Religious Association, in FREEDOM 
OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 386, at 109, 122; Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra 
note 7, at 314; Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 7, at 16; Michael W. 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 685, 717 (1992); McConnell, Singling Out Religion, supra note 7, at 9. 
Laycock writes: 
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders thought so. The 
proper relation between religion and government was a subject of great debate in 
the founding generation, and the Constitution includes two clauses that apply to 
religion and do not apply to anything else. This debate and these clauses presuppose 
that religion is in some way a special human activity, requiring special rules 
applicable only to it. 
Laycock, Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 7, at 16. 
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government action burdens individual religious exercise.444 In Amos, 
the Court held that similar legislative accommodations for religious 
groups do not violate the Establishment Clause even if nonreligious 
groups do not receive the same benefits. According to the Court, “it 
has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to 
religious groups are per se invalid.”445 Rather, “[w]here, as here, 
government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the 
exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities.”446 
While the Court’s decisions in recent years may be more “neutralist” 
than in the past, they do not embrace a thoroughgoing neutralism 
that treats religion and nonreligion exactly alike. Indeed, just last 
term in Locke v. Davey,447 the Court rejected such a view and 
expressly reaffirmed the distinctive treatment of religion under the 
First Amendment.448
So far, I have offered a justification for protecting religious 
groups that should appeal to believers and nonbelievers alike. 
Religious groups and the ideas they generate are an important source 
of new perspectives for social and political life, and the same role 
played by nonreligious groups justifies strong protections for them as 
well. For many scholars, a defense of free exercise protections that is 
based, instead, on the special value of religious convictions or the 
special authority of religious commands in the lives of believers 
would be unconvincing to nonbelievers.449 Whereas in the founding 
era, supporters of religious liberty may have defended protections on 
the ground that religion is, in Madison’s words, a “duty towards the 
Creator” and “precedent, both in order of time and in degree of 
 444. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text. 
 445. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). 
 446. Id. 
 447. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
 448. Id. at 1313 (“[T]he subject of religion is one in which both the United States and 
state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free exercise, but opposed to 
establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other [secular] callings or 
professions.”). 
 449. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 7, at 1248, 1261–66; Gedicks, Defensible Free 
Exercise Doctrine, supra note 7, at 950–52. 
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obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,”450 this type of argument is 
not persuasive today. As Lupu and Tuttle have written, “Madison’s 
confident assertion of the supremacy of religious duties over secular 
ones no longer seems self-evident.”451
Before I close, I hope the reader will indulge me in such an 
argument. If the reader will permit, I will show that a view that takes 
seriously the ultimate importance of religious belief supports the 
same conclusions as the more ecumenical approach taken above. For 
those in the founding era and many believers today, the Free 
Exercise Clause reflects a faith in a transcendent reality that grounds, 
guides, and communicates with the temporal world. It is this 
transcendent point of reference that is the source of truths for 
individual conduct, social relationships, and political life, and these 
truths are, in turn, the basis for legal and political legitimacy. 
However, the Free Exercise Clause also reflects the fact that our 
understanding of this divinity is limited. We see but in a “mirror 
dimly.”452 Despite the many truths manifest in creation and even 
with the added light of revelation, the God we seek is yet partly 
hidden, and out of this mystery different traditions develop. These 
traditions all bear insights, though partial and incomplete, of a 
greater reality that remains always beyond our ken even as it 
continually beckons us to draw nearer. Without freedom to grow 
and develop unimpeded by the state, much of value within these 
faiths would be lost and our understanding would be diminished. 
Valuable insights are not limited to believers. God’s grace extends to 
those who do not know Him by name. The Christian tradition 
teaches that the world is fallen and correct understanding requires 
the assistance of revelation, but God has not abandoned His creation 
and good remains. Indeed, much can be known through human 
reason and experience, even unaided by faith, and believers can learn 
much from those outside their faith. True progress requires humility 
by all. Believers and nonbelievers need one another, and only 
together can they draw closer to the reality that orders, sustains, 
redeems, and perfects the world and those within it. Thus, unless 
broad freedoms are extended to nonreligious groups as well as 
 450. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ESTABLISHMENTS (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert 
A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973). 
 451. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 106, at 39–40. 
 452. 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
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religious ones, the entire community will suffer, believers and 
nonbelievers alike. 
 
 
 
 
 
